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I. INTRODUCTION
In the corporate governance debate, institutional investors’
voting is a “hot topic” both in the U.S. and the European Union.
To the contrary, “no one cares very much about retail investor
voting”. 1 Recent U.S. scholarship however, emphasizes the need to
re-engage retail shareholders and explores a variety of possible
means for retrieving lost shareholders. 2 The U.S. approach to retail
investors’ distance from the corporate governance scene is one step
ahead of the EU, whose regulatory framework seems to focus on
retail investors as capital suppliers rather than shareholders.
Since the enactment of the 2004 Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive (MiFID), 3 the EU’s long-standing
regulatory policy aimed at fostering the development of stronger
and efficient EU capital markets 4 has targeted retail investors as
capital providers more closely than in the past. Based on a
harmonized regulatory framework for financial services intended
to ensure adequate investor protection on integrated markets, the
unlocking of household savings to be channeled to the markets—
directly or through intermediaries—is regarded as a driver of
greater market depth and efficiency. Hence, promoting retail
investor market participation ranks among the settled objectives
Jill. E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded
Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 12 (2017).
2
See infra Part IV.
1

3
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives
85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2001
O.J. (L 145) 1. MiFID I was later replaced by Directive 2014/65/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU
(recast), 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 [MiFID II], that applies from Jan. 3, 2018.
4
See Communication from the Commission. Implementing the framework
for financial markets: Action plan, COM (1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999).

Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), aiming, as a general objective, to
overcome financial market segmentation and allow business and consumers to
directly access cross-border financial institutions, and setting the three “strategic
objectives” of (i) developing a single European market in wholesale financial
services; (ii) creating open and secure retail markets; (iii) ensuring financial
stability through establishing adequate prudential rules and supervision. John
Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance
and Crisis, 48 COMM’N MKT. L. REV. 125, 126 (2011) (noting that the
implementation of the FSAP “has seen the emergence of a truly pan-European
securities law”).
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of the EU regulatory policy. This objective is apparent from a
consideration of some illustrative initiatives amongst the large
number that have been taken in the field of financial regulation.
Similarly to the U.S. “Plain English” initiative, 5 the
prospectus summary regime adopted under Article 5(2) of
Directive 2003/71/EC 6 in the context of public offerings, which has
been replaced by Article 7 of Regulation 2017/1129/EU—
Prospectus Regulation, 7 is one very clear example of the
willingness to facilitate access by retail investors to securities
markets. 8 While not replacing the prospectus, the summary is
intended to help unsophisticated investors when considering
whether to make investment decisions. To aid unsophisticated
investors, the summary provides key information concerning the
offering in a clear and concise manner by using everyday language
to avoid information overload. 9
Presentation of Information in Prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2008).
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
4 Nov. 2003 on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are Offered to
the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending; Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003
O.J. (L 345) 64 [Prospectus Directive], as amended by Directive 2010/73/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Nov. 2010 amending
Directives 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading; Directive 2004/109/EC on the
Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information
About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated
Market, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 1.
7
Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are
offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing
Directive 2003/71/EC, 2017 O.J. (L 168) 12.
8
See Giovanni Strampelli, The EU Issuers’ Accounting Disclosure Regime
5
6

and Investors’ Information Needs. The Essential Role of Narrative Reporting,

9 (Bocconi University Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 3003743) (July
15, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3003743. See also Veerle Colaert, Investor
Protection in the Capital Markets Union, in CAPITAL MARKETS UNION IN
EUROPE, 345, No. 16.13 (Danny Busch at al. eds., 2018) (illustrating that the
trend in the legislation to emphasize the need for short, comprehensible and
comparable product information is explained by insights on consumer
information overload, limits to investor rationality and the risk that information
can lead to a shift in liability risk to the retail investors).
9
See recitals 28, 30 and 32 to the Prospectus Regulation. Under Article 7 of
the Prospectus Regulation, the length of the summary is set at seven A4 pages.
Following public consultation, in July 2018, the European Securities and
Markets Authority [hereinafter ESMA] issued regulatory technical standards
(RTS) under the new Prospectus Regulation including content and format of the
key financial information to be disclosed in the prospectus summary: see EUR.
SEC. MKTS. AUT., DRAFT REGULATORY TECHNICAL STANDARDS UNDER THE
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EU-wide regulation has massively supported retail
investors’ indirect access to securities. The composite framework
put in place in stages through the enactment of and subsequent
amendments to the Directives on Undertakings for Collective
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) 10, Insurance
Distribution (IDD) 11 and Institutions for Occupational Retirement
Provision (IORPs) 12 has allowed intermediaries to offer an everwidening range of mutual funds, insurance-based investment
products, and pension schemes. Whilst varying in size and by type
of institutional investor across different Member States, assets
managed by investment funds, insurance companies and pension
funds have significantly increased in the EU over the last fifteen
years, both in absolute value and as a share of EU GDP. 13
Moreover, indirect investments through institutional investors are
expected to further increase, in particular from pension funds. 14
In its 2015 Action Plan on building a capital markets union
(CMU), the European Commission (EC) further committed itself
to improving cross-border access to retail investment products,
noting that
Today, retail investors in Europe have significant
savings in bank accounts, but are less directly
involved in capital markets than in the past. Direct
share ownership of European households has
dropped from 28% in 1975 to 10-11% since 2007 and
the proportion of retail investors among all
shareholders is less than half the level it was in the
PROSPECTUS REGULATION (Final Report ESMA 31-62-1002), 10 et seq.
(July 17, 2018).
10
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS) (recast), 2009 O.J. (L 302) 32, as last amended by Directive
2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014, 2014
O.J. (L 257) 186 [UCITS V].
11
Directive 2016/97/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
20 January 2016 on insurance distribution (recast), 2016 O.J. (L 26) 19, fully
recasting Directive 2002/92/EC (Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD).
12
Directive 2016/2341/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 14 Dec. 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational
retirement provision (IORPs) (recast) 2016 O.J. (L 354) 37 [IORP II].
13
See Zsolt Darvas & Dirk Schoenmaker, Institutional Investors and the
Development of Europe’s Capital Markets, in CAPITAL MARKETS UNION IN
EUROPE, 399-402 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2018).
14
Id. at 402.
NEW
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1970s. Removing the barriers to retail investors
saving via the capital markets requires competitive
financial markets that can offer choice to allow
customers to compare products and find the most
suitable savings vehicles at competitive prices. 15
As a consequence, in March 2017, the Commission
published a wide-ranging Action Plan on retail financial services
and insurance which sets out a strategy to strengthen the EU single
market for retail financial services and harnesses the potential of
digitalization and technological developments (so-called FinTech)
in order to improve consumer access to financial services
throughout the EU. 16 Since households are the ultimate providers
of savings in the economy, the measures envisaged in the Action
Plan should help mobilize retail investors towards market-based
investment products by positively impacting their “relatively high
degree of risk aversion, the lack of an “equity culture”, a low level
of financial expertise, and a lack of trust in financial markets”. 17
Thus, “in an even more explicit way than previous investor
protection initiatives, the CMU approaches investor protection as
a tool to increase retail investor participation in the capital
markets”. 18
From the standpoint of EU policy, encouraging retail
investors to participate in the financial markets more deeply and
widely has certainly become ever more crucial, given that “[r]etail
market investment is increasingly necessary to finance retirement,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union,18, COM (2015)
468 final, (Sept. 30, 2015).
16
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Central Bank, European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Consumer Financial Services
Action Plan: Better Products, More Choice, COM (2017) 139 final (Mar. 23,
2017). The Plan comprises action aimed at: increasing consumer trust and
empower consumers when buying services at home or from other Member
States; reducing legal and regulatory obstacles affecting businesses when
providing financial services abroad; supporting the development of an
innovative digital world to overcome some of the existing barriers to the Single
Market.
17
See EUR. FUND AND ASSET MANAG’T ASS’N (EFAMA), Asset
Management in Europe. Facts and figures, 16 (May 2017),
http://www.efama.org/statistics/sitepages/asset%20management%20report.asp
x.
18
Colaert, supra note 8, at 314, n. 16.01.
15

1/24/2019 10:28 AM

3-Balp (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

52

Vol. 31:1

education, and other social needs” 19 and “also remains an
important source of stable capital for companies”. 20
To support direct investments at listed companies, EUwide regulation has focused on strengthening investors as
shareholders. Based on the 2003 Commission’s communication on
modernizing company law and enhancing corporate governance, 21
the Shareholders’ Rights Directive (SRD) was enacted in 2007 to
enhance shareholders’ rights and address problems relating to
cross-border voting. 22 As was acknowledged by the European
lawmakers,
[h]olders of shares carrying voting rights should be
able to exercise those rights given that they are
reflected in the price that has to be paid at the
acquisition of the shares. Furthermore, effective
shareholder control is a prerequisite to sound
corporate governance and should, therefore, be
facilitated and encouraged. 23
Several measures were introduced to accomplish that policy
goal. In many Member States, share blocking during a certain
period prior to the general meeting, and up to the end of the
meeting, was a requirement for participation and voting. Share
blocking was found to inhibit institutional shareholder voting
since it overly restricted the ability to trade shares. Therefore,
share blocking was prohibited and replaced by a system based on
a “record date” (Article 7 of SRD). Under the record date scheme,
only shareholders of record as of a specified cut-off date in advance
of the general meeting are entitled to vote, irrespective of whether
such shareholders will actually still hold their shares on the day of
the meeting. New rules on transparency regarding the information
provided prior to the meeting, timely and fast access to such
information (Article 5), voting by proxy (Article 10), participation
Niamh Moloney, Regulating the Retail Markets: Law, Policy, and the
Financial Crisis, 63 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 375, 388 (2010).
20
Id. at 396.
19

21
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance
in the European Union. A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May
21, 2003).
22
Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies,
2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 [hereinafter SRD].
23
See recital 3 to SRD.
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in general meetings at a distance via electronic means (Article 8),
and voting by correspondence (Article 12) were also introduced.
Shareholders were further granted the right to place items on the
agenda and to table draft resolutions concerning agenda items,
subject to a threshold (if any) not exceeding 5% of the company’s
share capital (Article 6), and to ask questions concerning agenda
items, which the company is required to answer (Article 9).
When presenting its proposal for a SRD, the EC not only
cautioned against the linkage between the rise of foreign
(institutional) share ownership of EU listed companies and
shareholder passivity, but also noted that “obstacles to crossborder voting may prevent small individual cross-border
shareholders willing to exercise their voting rights from reaping the
benefits expected in the near future from the technological
advances of electronic voting.” 24
Hence, the removal of obstacles to cross-border voting has
been regarded as a means to both increase cross-border voting
records of institutional shareholders and to “make cross-border
voting for small individual shareholders a real possibility in a near
future.” 25 At the same time, a reduction in the costs associated with
cross-border voting by leveraging technology has been expected to
allow small individual investors “to reap the benefits of the
advances in information technology. Although electronic voting by
distance is too costly for the moment, especially for individual
shareholders, technological progress could allow for reducing such
costs dramatically in the near future.” 26
On the whole, the sweeping European regulatory
commitment to encourage individuals to participate in the capital
markets is clear. However, despite all of the measures adopted to
date, the role actually played by retail investors in direct corporate
financing and governance remains weak. There still appears to be
regulatory schemes which are somewhat inconsistent with that
policy goal.
First, retail investors continue to play a role in corporate
finance that is less significant than in the U.S. In the EU, retail
24
Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of
voting rights by shareholders of companies having their registered office in a
Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market
and amending Directive 2004/109/EC. Impact assessment, at 1, COM (2005) 685

final, 2006 SEC 181 (Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n Staff, Annex]
25
Id. at 3.
26
Id. at 38.
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investors are more often than not offered packaged products
instead of shares or other corporate securities, and agency
ownership prevails: 78% of EU households’ financial assets are
held through life insurance, investment and pension funds. 27 In the
U.S., retail shareholders own approximately one third of publicly
traded shares, 28 and are a more substantial source of direct
corporate financing. 29 In comparison, retail direct share ownership
accounts for just about 10% of direct corporate financing in
Europe. 30
Second, although enhanced protection of shareholder rights
is conceived as “a key precondition for economic growth in the
EU”, 31 more than ten years after the enactment of the SRD, and six
after completion of its transposition into national law, retail
shareholder voting turnout at European general meetings remains
low. 32 Although voting turnout has been generally increasing over
the last decade, this seems to depend mainly on institutional
See BETTER FINANCE ASBL (THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF
INVESTORS
AND
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
USERS),
also Diego
http://betterfinance.eu/no_cache/home/other-investors/. See
Valiante, CMU and the Deepening of Financial Integration, in CAPITAL
MARKETS UNION IN EUROPE, 18, n. 2.22 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2018) (noting
that “[a]ccess to capital markets for European households often takes place
through expensive intermediation, like insurance wrappers or pension funds”.).
28
See, e.g., Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good are Shareholders?,
HARV. BUS. REV. 48, 51 (July-Aug. 2012) (illustrating that “[i]n 1950 households
owned more than 90% of the shares of U.S. corporations. Now institutions hold
approximately 50% of the domestically owned shares of public companies [. . .].
Add in institutional owners from overseas (foreign ownership of U.S. shares isn’t
broken down between individuals and institutions) and hedge funds (which are
counted mostly under households), and the true institutional share is probably
closer to 65% or 70%.”). Hence, although ownership of U.S. publicly listed
corporations is increasingly institutionalized, retail investors are still more
important shareholders in the U.S. than they are in the EU. One reason for such
difference also lies in that the European financial system has historically been,
and still is, bank-based, as opposed to the market-based U.S. system: see
EFAMA, supra note 17, at 13 (illustrating that “total assets of the banking sector
averaged 316% of the GDP in the European Union in 2010-2014, compared to
115% in the United States. During this period, total EU stock market
capitalization amounted to 64% of GDP, compared to 127% in the United
States.”. Since European businesses remain too heavily reliant on banks for
funding and not enough on capital markets, the CMU Action Plan intends to
promote more diversified funding channels to the real economy and help reduce
the reliance on bank lending and intermediation in the financial system.
29
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30
Id.
31
Eur. Comm’n Staff, Annex, at 8.
32
See infra Part II.B.
27
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investors’ increased engagement with investee companies,
including voting. This outcome was driven to a significant degree
by the adoption of the record date regime, and by enhanced
regulatory and market pressures on institutional investors to take
on stewardship responsibilities. 33 In contrast, voting has seemingly
remained a costly and cumbersome issue for small individual
investors.
In the U.S., retail voter turnout has been gradually
decreasing over time. Despite holding the potential to increase
turnout significantly, the retail base is weakly involved in
engagement when compared to institutional shareholders. In fact,
“[m]ore than 30% of the shareholdings of US public companies are
held in retail hands, but only 29% of that segment voted in 2014,
and retail participation hardly varies based on company size.” 34
The very same has been found to apply in relation to the U.S. 2017
proxy season. 35
Nevertheless, individual share ownership and voting are as
important in the European corporate landscape as in the U.S. 36
First, individual shareholders, who are by nature largely long-term
investors, can be viewed as a source of long-term corporate
financing. Second, retail investor votes can in some cases be
decisive for the outcome at general meetings by either supporting,
or contrasting, the board, “traditional” institutional investors (like
actively managed mutual or pension funds), or activists (like hedge
funds). Third, although ownership of publicly listed corporations
is increasingly institutionalized, retail investors are not denied
direct access to equity markets. 37 Therefore, the issue of retail
shareholders’ factual distance from participation in corporate
governance should not be disregarded by the assertion that retail
shareholders are motivated solely by the receipt of dividends. 38
33
34

See infra Part II.A.
See BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC., RETAIL

INVESTOR

(MKT
713
15,
2015),
http://go.broadridge1.com/ValueofRetailShareholderData.
35
See
BROADRIDGE
FINANCIAL
SOLUTIONS
&
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PROXY PULSE, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW, 2
(Sept. 2017) (table featuring “Beneficial Share Ownership and Voting 2017
Proxy Season”), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-2017proxy-season-review.pdf.
36
See infra Part III.
37
See infra Part III.A and note 249.
38
See, e.g., UK INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS SOCIETY (SHARESOC),
GUARANTEED VOTES FOR ALL. HOW TO REFORM THE UK SHARE OWNERSHIP,
14 (Sept. 2014), https://www.sharesoc.org/Guaranteed_Votes.pdf (explaining
PROVIDES

SILVER

LINING
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Of course, rational apathy 39 is crucial in explaining retail
investors’ largely passive behavior, especially within contexts of
concentrated ownership which are typical for many European
countries. 40 However, SRD shareholder empowerment
notwithstanding, the persistence of rational apathy raises the
question as to whether, and to what extent, retail investors’
passivity might also be rooted in some regulatory shortcoming.
One illustrative example concerns EU issuers’ accounting
information based on International Accounting Standards and
International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS)
according to regulation 1606/2002/EC. 41 Due to their complexity,
IAS/IFRS are not suited to meet the information needs of
unsophisticated shareholders and therefore do not help promote
retail investor voting. As has recently been suggested, simplified
and plain language narrative information might complement the
numerical sections of the financial statements and render financial
reports more readable by private investors. 42 Given the lack of a
harmonized EU regime of narrative reporting, the European
Securities and Markets Authority might be motivated to promote
the pursuit of proactive enforcement activities at the national level
with a view to developing guidance and recommendations
concerning the contents and format of narrative reporting, while
how the existing UK system of share ownership, largely based on nominee
accounts, “disenfranchises the vast majority of private retail shareholders.”).
39
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-92 (1986); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW, 91 (1991).
40
For a general overview of the ownership structure of listed companies in
OECD countries see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
FACTBOOK
11-14
(2017),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporate-governance-factbook.htm [hereinafter
OECD FACTBOOK].
41
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards,
2002 O.J. (L243) 1 (IAS Regulation).
42
See Strampelli, supra note 8. See also Bernhard Pellens & André Schmidt,

Verhalten und Präferenzen deutscher Aktionäre. Eine Befragung von privaten
und
institutionellen
Anlegern
zum
Informationsverhalten,
zur
Dividendenpräferenz und zur Wahrnehmung von Stimmrechten, 77-79

(Studien
des
Deutschen
Aktieninstituts)
(Feb.
2014),
https://www.dai.de/files/dai_usercontent/dokumente/studien/2014-1102%20Studie%20Aktionaersverhalten.pdf (finding that retail investors make
poor use of information included in issuers’ accounting disclosures and rely
more heavily on information from the press, which confirms that “many retail
investors do not view themselves as addressees of IFRS financial statements”:
this is an argument in favor of simplified narratives and investor summaries).
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also providing national enforcers with corresponding guidelines. 43
Further, with respect to the SRD, shareholder-empowering
provisions are largely conceived to facilitate and promote
engagement with investee companies by institutional investors—
rather than small individual investors. 44 For instance, from the
retail investor standpoint, it may be argued that the non-binding
nature of the provisions on voting at a distance could help in
explaining why electronic voting has not actually evolved into an
option generally available for small shareholders. At the same
time, the mechanics of voting, either in person or by proxy, remain
uneven, especially in cases involving cross-border relationships.
This is also due to inefficiencies that characterize the investment
chain with respect to the process for communicating with, and
voting by, shareholders that hold their shares in the multi-leveled
securities depositories and intermediaries system. Another factor is
the absence of a reliable system for shareholder identification,
especially where share ownership is mostly based on nominee
accounts, as seen in the UK. The 2007 SRD failed to specifically
engage with and resolve both the issues of the inefficiencies of the
investment chain and that of shareholder identification.
Against this backdrop, retail investors at listed companies
may deserve reconsideration. Whether their apathy is truly
inevitable seems to be questionable. To begin with, regulatory
shortcomings such as those pointed out above should be remedied.
A number of new measures were adopted under the newly enacted
directive (EU) 2017/828 of 17 May 2017 amending the 2007 SRD
(SRD II), 45 aimed at facilitating shareholder identification,
improving the transmission of information along the investment

Strampelli, supra note 8, para. 9.
See Rebecca Strätling, How to overcome shareholder apathy on
corporate governance. The role of investor associations in Germany, 83 ANNALS
43
44

OF PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 143, 145 (2012) (noting that “the participation
of private retail investors in firms’ corporate governance has largely be ignored.
Instead, attention has focused on how to incentivize blockholders or
institutional investors to contribute to the supervision and control of the
companies they invest in”.); Marina B. Madsen, Promoting the ‘Right’ Kind of
Ownership: The Good, the Bad and the Passive, EBLR 143, 149 (2018). See also
Hanne S. Birkmose, The Transformation of Passive Institutional Investors into
Active Owners: ʽMission Impossibleʼ?, 107, in THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL
MARKET IN TRANSITION (Hanne S. Birkmose et al. eds., 2012).
45
Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement
of long-term shareholder engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132), 1 [hereinafter SRD II].
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chain and facilitating the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 46
Although the new rules clearly prioritize institutional investor and
asset manager engagement, they can be beneficial also for retail
investors willing to vote at general meetings, and can positively
affect corporate communication programs that specifically target
individual shareholders. 47
However, the removal of these important hurdles still may
not be enough to convince retail shareholders to participate more
actively in the voting process. Even if the overall mechanics of
voting were substantially improved in terms of their efficiency, this
would not resolve the impact of decision-making costs in regards
to how to vote and psychological shortfalls, which negatively
impact upon retail shareholders’ voting behavior. 48
Interestingly, the issue of mobilizing retail votes is
becoming increasingly supported in the U.S., where voting at a
distance, whether electronically or by telephone, is widespread. 49
Moreover, a growing number of U.S. corporations hold electronic
AGMs, in some cases as full substitutes for physical meetings. The
fall in retail investor voting rates despite the relatively significant
proportion of retail share ownership in U.S. publicly traded
corporations has prompted some scholars to address the issue of
disengaged retail shareholders. While the tools proposed for
revitalizing individual shareholders differ, they all give
consideration to decision-making costs and behavioral biases
affecting participation. 50
In order to explore whether, and if so how, retail investors
might be induced to become more actively involved in EU investee
companies, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides some
evidence from various EU Member States as to how relevant retail
shareholdings actually are in corporate ownership, as compared to
institutional investors. Against this backdrop, Part III argues in
favor of increased retail shareholder participation. Part IV
illustrates the U.S. debate on mobilizing retail votes. Part V
explores the potential constraints on retail shareholder engagement
46
47
48
49

See infra Part V.A.2.
Id.
See infra Part V.A.
See Fisch, supra note 1, at 34 (reporting that “Broadridge’s innovations

offered retail investors the first modern alternatives to submitting their voting
instructions by mail—initially enabling telephonic submission and then
electronic submission through proxyvote.com. Of the retail shares that are
currently voted, more than two-thirds are voted through proxyvote.com”).
50
See infra Part IV.
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posed by the current European regulatory framework and
comparatively assesses whether, and if so how, the U.S. proposals
for activating passive retail investors might provide a blueprint for
similar initiatives in Europe. Part VI sets out the conclusions.

II. INSTITUTIONAL VS RETAIL SHAREHOLDINGS AND
VOTING IN CONTEXT

The first step to be made when addressing the question as
to whether small individual investors should be given more
nuanced consideration within the corporate governance
framework for EU listed companies is to examine more closely the
factual economic context in which current regulation works. The
examination of the distinctive features of institutional and retail
investors as shareholders, their relative significance in terms of EU
publicly traded share ownership, their voting behavior and its
impact on listed companies will provide the background
framework for the following analysis.

A. The rise of institutional shareholder ownership and
engagement in Europe
There is more than one reason for the rise in institutional
shareholder engagement that all European jurisdictions have
experienced over the last two decades. 51 This includes contexts
where concentrated share ownership prevails. 52 Institutional share
ownership at listed companies has increased dramatically in
Europe, so much so that institutional investors have become the
dominant owners of public equity. 53 Keeping this mind, the SRD

See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN, KNOCKING

AT THE DOOR. SHAREHOLDER
EUROPE
(Aug.
2014),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer/mabriefing_activism_july2014.pdf.
Referred to the US see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM.
WHO,
WHAT,
WHEN,
AND
HOW?
(Mar.
2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/publications/assets/pwcshareholder-activism-full-report.pdf.
52
See, e.g., Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor
51

ACTIVISM

IN

Activism in a Context of Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of
Control: the Case of Italy (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 225/2013) (Mar.
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2325421.
53
See Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional investors and ownership
engagement, 95-193 (OECD Journal: Fin. Market Trends (2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2013-5jz734pwtrkc.
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provisions strengthening shareholder rights 54 operate in
conjunction with those set by stewardship and corporate
governance codes that target institutional investors as
shareholders in order to foster their constructive engagement with
investee companies as a part of institutions’ investment
management activities. 55 Though non-binding in nature, selfregulation has exerted considerable pressure upon institutional
investors to take on stewardship responsibilities, including voting
and the disclosure of voting policies and votes actually cast. 56
The trend towards responsible stewardship has been
further enhanced by the SRD II, adopted following the EC’s 2010
and 2011 Green Papers on corporate governance in financial
institutions, 57 and the EU corporate governance framework, 58
which identified shareholder engagement as an aim of EU
regulatory action. Based on “evidence that the majority of
shareholders are passive and are often only focused on short-term
profits”, the Commission found that shareholders should be
“encouraged to take an interest in sustainable returns and longer
term performance and [. . .] to be more active on corporate
governance issues”. 59 Therefore, the SRD II introduced a set of
provisions intended to promote “the level and quality of
engagement of asset owners and asset managers with their investee
companies,” 60 while also providing a broad definition of the notion
of engagement. According to Article 3g (1)(a) of SRD II, engaging
entails
54
55

See infra Part I.
See, e.g., FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012),

https://www.frc.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code, and ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2015),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/g20-oecd-principles-ofcorporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en.
56
See, e.g., UK Dep’t for Bus. Innov. & Skills, Exploring the Intermediated
Shareholding Model, 136 (BIS Research Paper No. 261) (Jan. 2016),
http://www.uksa.org.uk/sites/default/files/BIS_RP261.pdf.
57
Eur. Comm’n, Green Paper. Corporate governance in financial
institutions and remuneration policies, COM (2010) 284 final (June 2, 2010).
58
Eur. Comm’n, Green Paper. The EU corporate governance framework.
COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011).
59
Id. at 3.
60
See Eur. Comm’n, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament

and the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement
of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards
certain elements of the corporate governance statement, 2, COM (2014) 0213
final, (2014) 0121 (COD), (Apr. 9, 2014). [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n, Explanatory
Memorandum].
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monitor[ing] investee companies on relevant
matters, including strategy, financial and nonfinancial performance and risk, capital structure,
social and environmental impact and corporate
governance, conduct[ing] dialogues with investee
companies, exercis[ing] voting rights and other
rights attached to shares, cooperat[ing] with other
shareholders, communicat[ing] with relevant
stakeholders of the investee companies and
manag[ing] actual and potential conflicts of interests
in relation to [. . .] engagement.
Accordingly, Article 3g of SRD II requires intermediaries—
on a comply or explain basis—to develop an engagement policy, to
publicly disclose the policy and report on its implementation on an
annual basis. Dislosure of an engagement policy should include a
general description of voting behavior, an explanation of the most
significant votes cast and the use made of proxy advisory services.
Intermediaries are further required to publicly disclose how they
cast votes at the general meetings of each investee company, except
for votes that are insignificant due to the subject matter or the size
of the holding.
Based on the fundamental concept that intermediated
investments must be managed in the best interest of those who
bear the associated economic risk, the SRD II implicitly leverages
the rationale of end-investor protection that underlies all
investment manager duties as agents in order to enhance their
duties as shareholders. As specifically regards voting, Article 3g of
SRD II must in fact be read within the context of the broader
regulatory framework governing discretionary portfolio and
collective investment management, 61 which entitles intermediaries
to vote on behalf of the shares owned by the funds they manage.
Because of this entitlement, Article 21 of Directive 2010/43 62 and
Article 37 of Regulation 231/2013 63 require mutual fund and
According to EFAMA, supra note 17, at the end of 2016, “Investment
fund assets accounted for 51.8% of all AuM, totaling EUR 11,800 billion,
whereas discretionary mandates represented 48.2% of total AuM, or EUR
11,000 billion”.
62
Commission Directive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
organisational requirements, conflicts of interest, conduct of business, risk
management and content of the agreement between a depositary and a
management company, 2010 O.J. (L 176) 42.
63
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 Dec. 2012
61
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alternative investment fund managers to establish a voting policy
determining when and how voting rights are to be exercised, to the
exclusive benefit of the funds concerned and their investors. The
exercise of voting rights is thus conceived of as a duty that
investment managers owe to end-investors wherever, based inter
alia on a cost-benefit analysis, voting is in the best interest of the
end-investor. Therefore, in a manner not very dissimilar to the
U.S., 64 a duty to vote every share is not mandated under European
law. Still, investment managers are not allowed simply to remain
passive and chose not to vote their shares. In effect, depending on
the investment strategies adopted, voting passivity might be in
conflict with institutions’ duty to manage investments in the best
interest of their clients. 65 Relying on the duty of intermediaries to
vote the shares pertaining to the funds managed, the transparency
provisions laid down by the SRD II as regards engagement
strengthen investment managers’ accountability to end-investors
with respect to voting.
Alongside regulation and self-regulation, the rise of
institutional investor engagement has also been supported by the
growth of the proxy advisory industry. Proxy advisory services—
particularly proxy analysis reports and voting recommendations—
are a cost-effective solution for helping institutional investors, fund
managers and investment advisers comply with stewardship and
voting requirements, fill information and knowledge gaps, and
provide relief from the cost and time-intensive work required to
process the relevant information. Thus, proxy advisors have
contributed to increasing the value of shareholders’ voice,
reducing investor apathy and providing a means for addressing
collective action problems that are inherent within institutional
shareholder action.
Finally, one of the reasons for the increase in institutional
investor engagement is the ever-growing number of stakes held in
issuers listed in Europe by foreign, international investors.
According to the EC, non-national shareholders—most of which
are institutional intermediaries—hold some 44% of the shares
supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council with regard to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries,
leverage, transparency and supervision, 2013 O.J. (L 83) 1.
64
See infra note 72.
65
See, e.g., Christian Strenger & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Governance,

Cross-border Voting and the (draft) Principles of the European Securities Law
Legislation—Enhancing Investor Engagement Through Standardisation, 13 J.
CORP. L. STUD., 503, 512-515 (2013).
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issued by EU listed companies. 66 In Germany, for example,
Blackrock, a U.S.-based institutional investment manager, became
the largest investor in publicly listed companies by 2008 and grew
quickly thereafter. 67 Further, other major institutional investors,
such as Vanguard, Fidelity and Capital Group, saw similar growth
with respect to investments in Germany’s publicly listed
companies. 68 By 2010, Norges Bank Investment Management, the
world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, had overtaken Allianz
Group and Deutsche Asset Management, the two major German
institutional investors. 69 Until 2007, both of these had been the
major shareholders in publicly listed German companies with
respect to overall value held as well as the number of block
holdings. 70
Given that a substantial proportion of shares in EU listed
companies under foreign ownership is held by large U.S.-based
investors, 71 there is no wonder that this factor has fueled
Eur. Comm’n, Explanatory Memorandum, at 3; OBSERVATOIRE DE
L’ÉPARGNE EUROPÉENNE (OEE) & INSEAD OEE DATA DERVICE (IODS), Who
66

owns the European Economy? Evolution of the ownership of EU-listed
20
(Aug.
2013),
companies
between
1970
and
2012,

https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/db5b2604e1d7-11e5-8a50-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [hereinafter OEE & IODS, Who
owns] (illustrating that over the last forty years, “the relative weight of foreign
investors more than quadrupled, from 10% in 1975 to 45% in 2012, or 38% in
2012 if funds domiciled in Luxembourg or Ireland are considered as domestic
investors rather than foreign ones”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, 26 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf.
67
See Jo Seldeslachts, Melissa Newham & Albert Banal-Estanol, Changes
in common ownership of German companies, at 305 (DEUTSCHES INSTITUT
FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG—DIW
Econ.
Bull.
30.201),
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.562467.de/diw_eco
n_bull_2017-30.pdf. For the position in Italy see Nadia Linciano, Angela
Ciavarella & Rossella Signoretti, 2016 Report on corporate governance of Italian
listed companies, 13-14 (CONSOB Statistics and Analyses) (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947709 (reporting that, at the end of 2015,
institutional investors were major shareholders in nearly 36% of the market,
holding on average 6.9% of the share capital in 83 firms; foreign institutional
investors owned major holdings especially in larger firms and in the financial
sector).
68
See Seldeslachts, Newham & Banal-Estanol, supra note 67, at 305, note
11.
69
Id. at 305-306.
70
Id. at 306.
71
Referred to the UK see OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., OWNERSHIP OF UK
QUOTED
SHARES:
2016,
para.
3,
5,
11,
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/own
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engagement with European issuers. As is well known, U.S.-based
institutional investors have a long-standing tradition of being more
active shareholders: an attitude they tend to replicate
internationally, supported by global and local proxy advisors. 72
By and large, combined with the adoption of the record
date system, 73 these factors account for the increased exercise of
voting rights in European issuers. This phenomenon is
remarkable; however, it is different from proactive activism
experienced in the U.S., where some institutional shareholders
show a more demanding, or even aggressive, attitude in exercising
shareholder rights as a means of targeting investee companies in
order to bring about a change in the boardroom or in the
company’s governance, business or strategy. 74 Notably, proactive
ershipofukquotedshares/2016 [hereinafter OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., OWNERSHIP]
(noting that “North American investors have increasingly invested directly in
the ordinary shares of UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange”. As
at Dec. 31, 2016, the “rest of the world” sector held 53.9% of the value of listed
UK companies’ ordinary shares, 48.1% thereof being held by North American
investors—mostly unit trusts, other financial institutions and pension funds).
72
In the U.S., voting by mutual and public pension funds was fueled by
regulatory action taken to heighten the fiduciary obligations applicable to voting
proxies, most notably i) by two companion SEC releases of 2003 addressing
voting disclosures for registered management investment companies and
registered investment advisers exercising voting authority over fund portfolios
(see Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003); Id., Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg.
6586 (Feb. 7, 2003); and ii) by Department of Labor interpretative guidelines
concerning the legal standards imposed by sections 402, 403 and 404 of Title I
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (see Department of
Labor, Interpretative Bulletin relating to the exercise of shareholder rights, 73
Fed. Reg. 61.732 (Oct. 17, 2008). Those rulings were largely (mis-)interpreted as
requiring addressees to vote on all matters, i.e. to vote every proxy.
73
See, e.g., Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholders as Stewarts: Evidence of
Belgian General Meetings, 5 (Financial Law Institute Working Paper Series,
WP 2013-05) (Jan. 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2270938 (assuming that the
increase in attendance rates at Belgian listed companies’ 2012 annual meetings
“is due to the abolishment of the “blocking of shares”).
74
See Peter Cziraki, Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagy, Shareholder
Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective, 16 EUR. FIN.
MGMT., 738 (2010) (finding that proposal submissions remain infrequent in
Europe compared to the U.S.; however, proposal sponsors are valuable
monitors, since they typically target underperforming and low-leverage firms.
Overall, the low voting support attracted by shareholder proposals and strongly
adverse market reactions suggest that proposals are used at European
companies as an emergency brake rather than a steering wheel). See also Angela
Giovinco, Activism. The Evolution of an Investor Strategy, 9 (Jan. 13, 2015)
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activism in Europe is still a long way behind the U.S., despite being
on the rise. 75
Although voting cannot be viewed as a measure of its
quality, it is one measure of the level of shareholder engagement
with investee companies. If measured with reference to voting,
there is little doubt that institutional investors and asset managers
have become more active shareholders. 76 On EU-average, the level
of voter turnout—the proportion of a company’s issued shares that
are voted at the general meeting—increased by 6.8 percentage
points between 2008 to 2015, from 60.4% to 67.2%. 77 Although
voter turnout data varies between different European countries, 78
this trend is Europe-wide, regardless of the lower or higher degree
of share ownership concentration. 79
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2549179 (noting that
“Activist campaigns, which have grown in popularity in the United States, are
less common in Europe”; further, European activism is described as “less
noisily” as in the U.S.).
75
See SKADDEN-ACTIVIST INSIGHT, ACTIVIST INVESTING IN EUROPE. A
SPECIAL REPORT (Oct. 2017) (noting that increased activism in Europe is partly
due “to a higher incidence of foreign activists looking for opportunities as the
U.S.
market
has
become
increasingly
picked
over”),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/10/activist-investing-ineurope-a-special-report-2017.
76
See generally Chris Mallin, Institutional investors: the vote as a tool of
governance, 16 J. MGMT. GOV. 177 (2012); Paul Hewitt, The Exercise of
Shareholder Rights: Country Comparison of Turnout and Dissent, 15-17
(OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 3, 2011),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54d0l1lvf-en.
77
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., EUROPEAN VOTING
RESULTS
REPORT.
2015
UPDATE,
10,
http://www.agefi.fr/sites/agefi.fr/files/migrate/etudereference/QPZEUUZFVN
_European%2520Voting%2520Results%2520Report%25202015.pdf.
78
See id., at 10 (illustrating data ranging from 48.9% in Denmark up to
75,2% in the UK); SCHUTZGEMEINSCHAFT DER KAPITALANLEGER E.V., SDKDAX,
http://www.sdk.org/assets/Statistiken/HVPRÄSENZSTATISTIK
Praesenzen/praesenz-dax15.pdf, (reporting that mean voter turnout at German
DAX 30 companies increased from 44.98% in 2005 to 54.95% in 2015).
79
One illustrating example is Italy: see Linciano, Ciavarella & Signoretti,
supra note 67, at 35 (noting that AGM attendance rates at top 100 Italian
companies kept steadily around 70% of the companies’ shares since 2012,
highlighting a gradual increase in the participation of institutional investors,
currently amounting to approximatively 19% of the companies’ shares, “
ascribable to the attendance pattern of foreign institutional investors (from
around 10% to 18% of the share capital over the last five years), while figures
for Italian investors have continued swinging around 1% of the capital.” In 2016,
foreign institutional represented on average more than one fourth of the capital
represented at the meetings of the 100 largest companies). Similarly, using the
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B. What has become of the retail investor?
Compared to institutional investors, retail investors seem to
be turning into minor actors on the European direct corporate
financing and the corporate governance scene. During the last
forty years, the proportion of households within the share
ownership structure of European listed companies has fallen by a
factor of almost three: 80 “[h]ouseholds held 28% of the market
capitalisation in 1975. Their stake dropped and stabilised at 1011% since 2007.” 81
Where indirect holdings of listed shares—through
investment funds, life insurance policies and pension funds—are
taken into consideration, “households are still major owners of
listed companies.” However, such ownership “has become more
and more intermediated in the last 30 years.” 82 Therefore,
number of voting instructions submitted as a proxy for active ownership at
Danish AGMs, “The number of voting instructions from foreign investors
continues to increase” (plus 14 per cent in 2017, and plus 80 per cent during the
period from 2014 to 2017): VP INVESTOR SERVICES, ANALYSIS AND
ASSESSMENT OF THE DANISH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS IN 2017, 7-8 (June
2017),
http://ipaper.ipapercms.dk/VPSecurities/VPINVESTORSERVICES/Analyser/
gf-analyse-2017/ (further illustrating that foreign investors’ ownership equals 53
per cent of the Danish equities market in 2017).
80
OEE & IODS, Who owns, at 21.
81
Id. at 24.; see also EUROSYSTEM HOUSEHOLD FINANCE &
CONSUMPTION NETWORK, The Eurosystem Household Finance and
Consumption Survey. Results from the first wave, 41-43 (ECB Statistics Paper,
No. 2, 2013), https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/154637 [hereinafter
Eurosystem Household Survey] (noting that, with only a small fraction of
households—between 5% and 12%—owning bonds, publicly traded shares or
mutual funds, participation in the stock market is “clearly below what is
suggested by economic theory, namely that all households with positive net
wealth should hold at least some publicly traded shares, for diversification
reasons and because of the higher expected return on stocks compared to other
investments”, and finding that stock market participation is very much related
to i) income and net wealth (among households in the lowest quintile of the
income distribution, only 2.2% own publicly traded shares, in contrast to 24.4%
in the top quintile); ii) age (holdings of publicly traded shares increase with age
and then decline, a pattern that is in line with a life-cycle behaviour of
accumulating savings over working-life, while spending savings after
retirement, and iii) education (only 4.2% of households with a reference person
with primary or no completed education participate in stock markets, as
opposed to 19.6% of households where the reference person has completed
tertiary education).
82
OEE & IODS, Who owns, at 55. Similarly, in the U.S., “over 66% of the
Russell 1000 companies are owned by Main Street investors, either directly or
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households still “play a critical role in allowing healthy financial
intermediation,” 83 but their importance as shareholders has been
steadily decreasing in significance. In the U.S., too,
“institutionalization” (or “deretailization”) is a characteristic
feature of equity markets. 84
The fall in direct share ownership can most likely be viewed
as a consequence of the shift towards indirect, managed
shareholding. 85 In fact, indirect share ownership allowing for
greater portfolio diversification and more efficient access to the
markets has now become predominant for individuals. This was
also as a consequence of the 1987, 2000 and 2008 crises, which
“convinced many individuals that equity markets were too risky
for them and that they were not at equality with professional
market participants.” 86 Alongside the perception of increased
market risk, lowered trust in equity markets, as well as punitive
taxation of dividends and capital gains in several countries, entry
costs, including information costs and the cost of financial literacy,
income uncertainty, health risks and behavioral biases further
impair households’ participation in the stock markets. 87 Moreover,
banks may have an incentive to sell packaged retail and insurancebased investment products (so-called PRIIPs), that generate higher
indirectly through mutual funds, pension or other employer-sponsored funds, or
accounts with investment advisers. And, if foreign ownership is excluded, that
percentage approaches approximately 79%”. Jay Clayton, Governance and
Transparency at the Commission and in Our Markets. Remarks at the PLI 49th
Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-2017-11-08 (last visited Apr.
12, 2018).
83
OEE & IODS, Who owns, at 9.
84
See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009);
Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1961, 2038 (2010); Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 573, Part II C.1 (2015), (illustrating that, after removal of the fixed
brokerage fees system in 1975, which was previously mandated in order to own
and trade individual stocks, and due to subsequent price competition and
technological advances, intermediary influence—specifically, stockbrokers
enjoying positional advantages vis-à-vis their individual clients—has
contributed to deretailization in favor of mutual funds basically out of a selfserving incentive at earning more profitable fees).
85
Clayton, supra note 82, at 21.
86
Id. at 9. According to EFAMA, supra note 17, at 3, at the end of 2015,
European asset managers held 54% of the value of the free float market
capitalization of euro area listed firms. Retail clients accounted for 27% of total
assets under management in Europe.
87
OEE & IODS, Who owns, at 25.
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and more stable fees, or banking products that help ensure
compliance with international liquidity ratios. 88
As regards its effects on a company’s corporate governance,
indirect share ownership results in a concentration of retail
investors’ voting interests, and the management thereof, at the
level of the investment manager. Given that beneficial owners of
the assets under management are prevented from making any
decision concerning the management of their investments,
including voting, the end-investor-best-interest principle is the
fundamental rule of conduct that is imposed upon investment
managers in order to protect beneficial owners.
Therefore, from the standpoint of the retail investor, voting
becomes an issue only where she directly owns a company’s shares.
But direct share ownership requires that shareholders willing to
vote become involved in the complex voting machinery and incur
high information and decision-making costs.
According to economic theory, due to the insignificant size
of their stakes, small individual shareholders, who—unlike
investment managers—have no responsibility to be active other
than that owed to themselves, are likely to be rationally apathetic
as regards gathering and processing the information needed to
make informed voting decisions on a management proposal.
Because, famously, “[w]hen many are entitled to vote, none expects
his vote to decide the contest,” and “none of the voters has the
appropriate incentives to study the firm’s affairs and vote
intelligently.” 89 Retail shareholders are therefore likely to trust the
board or rely on larger investors’ monitoring efforts and abstain
from voting at all. After all, rational apathy can be an explanation
for the preference of managed share ownership. 90 Similarly,
shifting to intermediated share ownership can be regarded as a
choice to eliminate the additional problem of individual
inadequacy—meaning the inability to make “good” voting
decisions due to inferior access to information, time, education,
experience as well as business judgment constraints 91—, which is
88

Id.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 66.
See Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, The High Costs of Shareholder
Participation, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 941, 949 (2009) (noting “Why are mutual funds
89
90

so widely held when they offer no participation in the underlying corporations
at all? Why do people hire investment advisors to distance themselves from
participating in their investments? One explanation is that the participatory
experience is not worth its cost to a rational investor.”).
91
See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS
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often used as an argument against shareholder empowerment. 92
Thus, shareholder apathy and inadequacy retain much intuitive
appeal with respect to the small individual investor, whose reliance
upon better-informed directors’ voting proposals and other
investors’ monitoring is logical, at least as regards ordinary
matters. 93
These arguments are consistent with low retail shareholder
turnout at general meetings. 94 While ample supporting empirical
evidence is available in this respect for the U.S., 95 the same does
not apply to the European context, where empirical surveys
focusing on retail investor participation at shareholder meetings
are rare and usually refer to specific Member States. Thus, a clear
EU-wide picture of retail shareholder voting is not easily gained,
and uncertainty exists to some extent.
To assess large and small shareholders’ attendance and
voting behavior at AGMs, a recent study considers a wide sample
of companies listed in seven representative EU Member States
over the period from 2010 to 2014. 96 To determine small
shareholder turnout rates, small shareholders are defined as all
shareholders who are not block holders. Whereas a block holder is
defined as a shareholder, or multiple shareholders that have
collectively entered into a shareholder agreement subject to public
disclosure according to Directive 2004/109/EC (“Transparency
Directive”), 97 holding at least 5% of all voting rights (the lowest
disclosure threshold in the Transparency Directive). 98 Assuming
that all block holders attend the meeting, the study found that the
mean voter turnout of small shareholders for the whole sample was
L. REV. 605, 625 (2007).
92
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745-49 (2006).
93
See Velasco, supra note 91, at 623.
94
See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 44, at 149 (noting that “[t]he group of
passive shareholders in European listed companies is a large fraction comprising
of both professional and retail shareholders”.).
95
See supra notes 34-35.
96
ANNE LAFARRE, THE AGM IN EUROPE: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
SHAREHOLDER BEHAVIOUR (2017), Part III.
97
Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and
amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, as amended by Directive
2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013,
2013 O.J. (L 294) 13 [hereinafter Transparency Directive]
98
See Article 9 of Transparency Directive.
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49.7% with a standard deviation of 18.1%. 99 Differences between
Member States are remarkable. In the UK, mean small
shareholder turnout rates are relatively high, with a rate around
60%, while they are substantially lower especially in Belgium and
Austria, with rates of about 21% and 31% respectively. 100
Interestingly, in most countries analyzed, small shareholder
turnout rates have increased over the years, suggesting that, in
contrast to economic theory, “some small shareholders (although
certainly not all) do vote, and that there is an increasing trend in
small shareholder voter turnout.” 101
However, due to the way in which the small shareholder is
defined for the purposes of the study, these findings do not allow
more precise conclusions to be drawn specifically in relation to
“genuine” retail investors. Indeed, defining small shareholders as
all those with holdings below the threshold of 5% of the voting
rights remains too wide a definition to insulate the retail
shareholder, whose stakes mostly remain largely underneath that
threshold. At the very best, these findings enable it to be stated
that, on average, the retail investor voter turnout rate at European
AGMs certainly does not reach 50%. This means that, by an
optimistic estimate, on average more than half of retail votes are
not cast. Were data to be purged of the impact of the votes of “nongenuine” small individual investors, such as smaller funds, the
actual retail investor voter average turnout rates would probably
be even lower.
This assumption is consistent with national data. For
example, according to a German survey based on questionnaires
addressed at Deutsche Post DHL investors, 36% of all retail
shareholders had not cast their votes during the previous two
years, and did not plan to change their voting behavior in future,
while only 11% personally cast their votes and 39% did so via a
proxy agent. 102 According to a survey supported by the French
Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), only one retail
shareholder out of three systematically, or frequently, votes her
shares, due to a perceived irrelevance of retail votes, an
Lafarre, supra note 96, at 110.
Id. at 112-113.
101
Id. at 115.
102
See Pellens & Schmidt, supra note 42, at 50, Table 18, and 51 (noting a
negative trend of retail votes especially as regards unexperienced investors). In
relation to Belgium, see van der Elst, supra note 73, at 11 (finding that “Only in
Bel 20 companies the mean attendance of these shareholders exceeds the 25%
threshold”).
99

100
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unawareness of how to vote, or a poor understanding of the issues
to be voted upon. 103

III. WHY DO RETAIL SHAREHOLDERS MATTER, AND WHY
SUPPORTING RETAIL VOTING IS NOT TRIVIAL

When we consider shareholder general meetings in
practice, to worry about retail investor absence might seem
frivolous. Operations at general meetings are frequently described
as standard and routine, and some particular portrait of attending
individual shareholders might be disheartening: events like those
at the 2016 Daimler AGM in Berlin, where the supervisory board
chair had to call the police when retail shareholders quarreled over
sausages at the buffet, make headlines. 104 There is reason to
believe, however, that the absence of retail shareholders at issuers’
general meetings is not a trivial concern.

A. Retail Share Ownership and Market Efficiency
Enhancing the governance role of retail investors could not
only incentivize retail share ownership of listed companies. 105
From a broader economic perspective, it also could help increase
equity markets efficiency. The massive withdrawal of retail
investors from listed stock ownership in the U.S. since the 1970s
has been found to have negative implications for capital formation,
investor protection, and market efficiency. Individual investors are
often seen as irrational and uninformed noise traders, 106 who
See AUTORITE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS, Lettre de l’Observatoire de
l’épargne de l’AMF, 3 (No. 9, June 2017), http://www.amf103

france.org/Publications/Lettres-et-cahiers/Lettre-de-l-observatoire-de-lepargne/Archives?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2F0729ba4aa168-4d3e-9a8a-ff88ceda788 [hereinafter AMF, Lettre]. Similar data are
referenced for the UK: see supra note 38, 24-25.
104
See
Büfett auf Hauptversammlung.
Daimler
Aktionäre streiten über Würstchen, SPIEGELONLINE (Apr. 7, 2016, 11:52 AM),

http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/wuerstchen-streit-zwischendaimler-aktionaeren-provoziert-polizeieinsatz-a-1085886.html.
105
See Arthur R. Pinto, The European Union’s Shareholder Voting Rights
Directive from an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and Observations,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 587, 620-621 (2009) (noting that “enhancing shareholder
voting could encourage more share ownership, which could then provide
additional support for improved corporate governance”).
106
See Werner F.M. De Bondt, A portrait of the individual investor, 42
EUR. EC. REV. 831 (1998) (finding that small individual investors who manage
their own equity portfolios discover naive patterns in past price movements,
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distort stock prices and harm market functioning. 107 This
generalization ignores the fact that retail trading may increase
share price accuracy and market allocative efficiency, and thus
give “substantial reasons to lament retail investor flight”. 108 In fact,
evidence suggests that retail investors play an important role in
market functionality by showcasing the existence of causal
relationships between the proportion of trading by individual
investors, stock price informativeness, and the probability of
informed trading. 109
The market-efficiency-enhancing effect of retail trading ties
in with findings which document that retail trading can add
market liquidity. 110 This is particularly important in regards to the
stocks of small firms, for which liquidity is often a significant
problem. Retail investors provide liquidity to institutional
investors who require immediacy in trade execution. 111 In fact,
retail traders seem to have some ability to act as market makers,
especially when institutional liquidity dries up in times of high
uncertainty. 112 Additionally, individual investors may have private
information and their trading can be informative, meaning that the
information incorporated into stock prices through collective
individual investors’ trading can be relatively precise and
valuable. 113 The improvement in stock price informativeness
share popular models of value, are not properly diversiﬁed and trade in
suboptimal ways).
107
See Brad M. Barber, Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu & Terrance Odean,
Just how much do individual investors lose by trading?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 609
(2009), and Bran M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Ning Zhu, Do retail trades move
markets?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 151 (2009) (finding that individual investor
trading results in systematic and economically large losses). See also Thierry
Foucault, David Sraer & David J. Thesmar, Individual investor and volatility,
66 J. FIN. 1369 (2011) (finding that retail investor trading adds volatility to stock
prices, which suggests they behave as noise traders).
108
See Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail Flight,
20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 36 (2014).
109
Id. at 45.
110
See Rong Ding & Wenxuan Hou, Retail investor attention and stock
liquidity, 37 INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INST. & MONEY 12 (2015) (finding that retail
investor attention to stock significantly enlarges the shareholder base and
improves stock liquidity).
111
See Ron Kaniel, Gideon Saar & Sheridan Titman, Individual Investor
Trading and Stock Returns, 63 J. FIN. 273 (2008) (documenting that risk-averse
individuals provide liquidity to meet institutional demand for immediacy).
112
See Jean-Noel Barrot, Ron Kaniel & David Sraer, Are retail traders
compensated for providing liquidity?, 2 (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10820)
(Sept. 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661549.
113
See Ron Kaniel, Shuming Liu, Gideon Saar & Sheridan Titman,
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determined by individual investor trading reduces information
asymmetry and enhances firm value. 114 At the same time, reduced
information asymmetry induced by individual investor trading
improves stock liquidity. 115
From an issuer standpoint, encouraging retail shareholder
participation builds upon shareholder loyalty to stabilize the
investor base, which in turn is expected to reduce stock volatility.
Retail investors are reported to be the most patient shareholders
with a long-term focus and little interest in speculative trading. 116
If retail shareholders were to become more active in voting, this
would probably enhance the beneficial effects associated with a
more stable investor base. In fact, owing to their past commitment
in voting shares, active shareholders are likely to become more
tightly tied to their shares and unwilling to sell up, even where
exiting is actually the optimal choice. 117 This effect is referred to as
the “sunk cost effect”: an effect explained as a behavior
“manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an
investment in money, effort, or time has been made”. 118 Hence,
exploiting retail investor sunk cost behavior by incentivizing
Individual Investor Trading and Return Patterns around Earnings
Announcements, 67 J. FIN. 639 (2012) (documenting evidence consistent with

informed or skillful trading by individual investors); Ekkehart Boehmer,
Charles M. Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Tracking Retail Investor Activity (Oct. 31,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822105 (finding
that retail investors are contrarian on average and quite well-informed as a
group, especially in smaller stocks with lower share prices, although do not
exhibit any market timing ability).
114
See Qin Wang & Jun Zhang, Does individual investor trading impact
firm valuation?, 35 J. CORP. FIN. 120 (2015).
115
See Qin Wang & Jun Zhang, Individual investor trading and stock
liquidity, 45 REV. QUANT. FIN. ACCT. 485 (2015).
116
See, e.g., AMF, Lettre, at 1-3; Brad M. Barber &Terrance Odean, The
Behavior of Individual Investors, 1539 in 2/B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF FINANCE (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013).
117
Though often associated with economically irrational individuals’
decisions, the sunk cost effect may still be rationally explained: R. Preston
McAfee, Hufo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Do Sunk Costs Matter?, 48 EC.
INQUIRY 323, 333-334 (2010) argue that ignoring sunk costs is rational “in
situations in which past investments are not informative, reputation concerns
are unimportant, and budget constraints are not salient.”
118
See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES, 124, 124 (1985) (explaining that
“[t]he prior investment, which is motivating the present decision to continue,
does so despite the fact that it objectively should not influence the decision. [. . .]
the psychological justification for this maladaptive behavior is predicated on the
desire not to appear wasteful.”).
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voting and increasing the proportion of active share owners can be
viewed as a possible issuer strategy for managing volatility risks. 119

B. Retail (Non-)Voting and Corporate Governance
From a corporate governance perspective, retail
shareholder voting passivity means losing a significant proportion
of the votes cast at shareholder meetings. Refraining from voting,
and relying on other investors’ voting to perform a monitoring
function, can distance the board or the controlling shareholders
from optimal monitoring. At companies with concentrated
ownership, retail shareholders’ apathy-driven reliance on
controlling shareholders’ or larger institutional investors’
monitoring may enhance the risks associated with the lack of
adequate controls over the controlling shareholders. At companies
with a dispersed ownership structure, retail shareholder passivity
may enhance the lack of adequate controls over the board.
Situations arise in which retail votes, were they exercised to
a larger extent than they currently are, might make the difference
in the outcome of the vote. For example, at contested elections,
retail shareholders might choose to either support the board’s
proposal, or to back alternative proposals made by activists or
major institutional shareholders. Therefore, increased retail
participation can strengthen shareholder monitoring which
ultimately fosters board and controlling shareholder
accountability.
As has been illustrated in relation to director elections in the
U.S., retail-investor voting can be regarded as a tool for
accomplishing the policy goal of striking an efficient balance
between board authority and accountability:
[i]t is estimated that retail investors hold
approximately one-quarter of the common stock of
U.S. public corporations. These retail investors
could indeed make the difference in director
elections if one could mobilize them. Their votes
could bolster the presumption of authority or
challenge it. 120
See generally Roth Parayre, The strategic implications of sunk costs: A
behavioral perspective, 28 J. EC. BEHAV. & ORG. 417 (1995).
120
Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally
Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of
Authority, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 547, 571 (2010).
119
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Just as any attempt to change the voting habits of retail
investors might shift the balance either in favor of the board’s
accountability, and against its authority, or in favor of its
authority, and against its accountability, in dispersed ownership
scenarios, the very same might apply in relation to controlling
shareholders at companies with concentrated ownership. As has
been noted by Professor Pinto,
The fact that a controlling shareholder has the votes
does not mean that shareholder voting is irrelevant.
In some countries, minority shareholders have
specific rights to protect themselves by voting on
certain issues or there may be a super majority vote
required for a particular action to be taken which
requires the votes of the minority shareholders. The
controlling shareholders may also consist of blocks
of different shareholders who may not always act
together and thus empower the minority in a given
case to supply the needed votes. But even if the vote
of the minority shareholders will not affect the
decision directly because of the control, the fact that
a vote needs to be taken could change the behavior
of those in control. The increased use of independent
directors on the boards of such companies may also
serve as a means to have those views of the public
shareholders
taken
seriously.
Controlling
shareholders may also consider the views of the
public minority shareholders to enhance its ability to
attract equity capital through good corporate
governance. 121
Enhanced institutional investor participation at
shareholders’ meetings renders voting outcomes more difficult to
predict, even in contexts of concentrated ownership. This in turn
increases the potential importance of retail investor votes. Also in
countries with a reputation for high levels of ownership
concentration, situations may arise in which voting outcomes
cannot ex ante be taken for granted. At de facto controlled
companies, where the controlling shareholder holds less than 50%
of the voting rights, this might typically be the case where proxy
fights occur, minority (institutional) shareholder slates are
submitted to be voted on at director elections, or the general
121

Pinto, supra note 105, at 617-18.
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meeting is to vote on material related-party transactions (see
Article 9(c) of SRD II). Further examples of challenging
shareholder meetings, where higher retail participation might be
outcome determinative, include those that vote upon say on pay
proposals (see Article 9(a) SRD II) or the approval of stock option
plans. As the likelihood of highly uncertain voting outcomes
increases, issuers will become more interested in reaching out for
their shareholders, including retail investors. In fact, issuers might
wish to gauge retail shareholders’ orientations or possibly
influence their votes. Importantly, active shareholders, or activists,
might share the very same interest at trying to win retail
shareholders to their cause.
In relation to the EU, one theoretically illustrative example
reported is that of Deutsche Bank AG, the largest German publicly
listed financial institution. Deutsche Bank AG’s overall
attendance rate at the 2015 AGM was only 33.4% of the voting
capital. 122 Keeping in mind that retail investors were holding a
significant 20% equity share in Deutsche Bank, and that, however,
their attendance rate was low, “it becomes obvious that this group
of investors “could indeed make the difference (. . .) if one could
mobilize them”“. 123 Deutsche Bank is not an isolated case. In Italy,
too, many companies have a large number of individual investors.
Almost 27% of the share capital of Assicurazioni Generali s.p.a.,
the major Italian insurance company, is currently held by retail
shareholders. 124 Institutional investors hold some 42.25%, and
major shareholders hold 20.14%. 125 Similarly, Crédit Agricole S.A.,
as a major bank, ranks second to date among CAC 40—the main
capitalization-weighted French stock market index—companies in
terms of the number of individual shareholders, with 1.7 million. 126
Given the remarkable proportion of retail shareholdings at such
companies, it will come as no surprise that Generali’s investor
relations department has built up a dedicated section for dealing
122
André Schmidt, Determinants of Corporate Voting. Evidence from a
Large Survey of German Retail Investors, 18 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 71, 72

(2017).
123
124

Id.
See GENERALI, https://www.generali.com/investors/Retail-shareholders

(last visited November 26, 2018).
125
See GENERALI, https://www.generali.com/investors/share-informationanalysts/ownership-structure (last visited April 10, 2018).
126
See
GROUP
CRÉDIT
AGRICOLE,
https://www.creditagricole.com/en/finance/finance/financial-press-releases/credit-agricole-s.a.named-best-cac40-company-for-retail-shareholder-services (last visited Apr. 11,
2018).
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with private shareholders 127, and that, to establish a closer
relationship with its individual shareholders, Crédit Agricole has
developed a communications system, as a part of its “Shareholders’
Club”, offering dedicated tools and documents, as well as meetings
on a variety of issues across France. 128
Importantly, as is also the case in the U.S., 129 significant
retail share ownership not only applies to some major issuers or
blue chips, but even more so to smaller listed companies. In France
for example, individual shareholders own, on average, 8% of the
capital of CAC 40 companies,
but among companies in the CAC PME index
[which tracks SMEs’ stock performance] this share
increases to an average of 28% [. . .]. The level of
individual share ownership varied between 1.8%
and 37% of share capital for the CAC 40 and
between 1.3% and 70% for the CAC PME. While
overall the average rate of individual share
ownership was stable between 2013 and 2014 for the
CAC 40, the CAC PME saw an average increase of
3.5%. 130
In the UK too, “evidence suggests AIM companies are
indeed owned to a greater extent by individual shareholders”. 131
By and large, these data sets show with sufficient clarity
that retail investors do, in some instances at least, yield significant
potential voting power that issuers are well aware of. This is why,
See GENERALI, https://www.generali.com/investors/Retail-shareholders
(last visited Apr. 10, 2018).
128
See supra note 126.
129
See BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS INC., supra note 34 (noting
that “Involving retail constituents is especially important for micro- and smallcap companies, for which individual investors represent 71% and 35% of the
shareholdings, respectively”).
130
See AUTORITÉ DES MARCHÉS FINANCIERS, 2015 AMF Study on
127

Programmes Set Up by Listed Companies to Communicate with Individual
Shareholders,
5
and
7
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.amf-

france.org/en_US/Publications/Rapports-etudes-et-analyses/Societes-cotees-etoperationsfinancieres?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2Ff558b4a6-6b8746c8-ab25-69aa9d6e4859 [hereinafter AMF, 2015 Study].
131
See OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., OWNERSHIP, para. 2 (illustrating that, at the
end of 2016, the “individuals” sector as a beneficial owner holds 9.5% of the
FTSE 100, 29.7% of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and 19.4% other
quoted companies).
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as Professor Aggarwal noted as a panelist to the SEC’s 2015
roundtable on proxy voting, retail investors’ thinking of not voting
because they believe their votes will not make a difference in
influencing corporate policy is actually incorrect thinking 132
At the aggregate level, deciding not to vote entails
outsourcing voting decisions to those shareholders who do vote,
which, generally speaking, might distort voting outcomes in favor
either of the board or (in controlled companies) the controlling
shareholder, or of activist shareholders, depending upon the side
which non-voted shares would presumably have backed had the
voting rights been exercised. Due to the scale of the phenomenon,
retail non-participation in the voting process can make it easier to
defeat shareholder proposals submitted by institutional investors
or activists when voted on, even where they might have been
beneficial for all shareholders, and make it more difficult to
challenge the board or the controlling shareholder, or to resist
aggressive, detrimental activist campaigns. 133
Retail apathy in voting cannot be blamed from a legal
perspective, since the small individual shareholder is under no
regulatory obligation to vote her shares. However, the absence of
retail investors within corporate governance weakens plural
control in that—as it is all but evident that the interests of different
classes of shareholders converge—the voice of shareholders will be
selectively represented at the general meeting. 134 Assuming that
retail investor voting preferences tend to be board-friendly—out of
loyalty, inability to process information, information
disadvantage, overconfidence etc.—, 135 the chances are that
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proxy Voting Roundtable Proceedings (unofficial
transcript), 91, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable/proxyvoting-roundtable-transcript.txt [hereinafter 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable
Unofficial Transcript]. See also Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the
Absent Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 55, 66 (2016) (noting that mobilizing 10-15% of the eligible voters could
have a substantial impact on the final voting results in contested elections,
withhold campaigns, or when shareholder proposals are brought to a vote to
bring about important governance changes).
133
See Kastiel & Nili, supra note 132, at 70-74.
134
See Fisch, supra note 1, at 15-16 (2017) (emphasizing that retail investor
voting preferences seem to systematically differ from those of institutional
investors and more often align with the board, and noting that “regardless of
whether retail shareholders vote differently from institutional voters, voting
results should convey the views of all shareholders.”).
135
See (referred to the U.S.) Choonsik Lee & Matthew E. Souther,
132

Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy
Delivery Methods, 5-6 (Oct. 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
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institutional investors, either traditional or activist, may lack
support from retail shareholders if they attempt to challenge the
board or the controlling shareholders.
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that many
companies voluntarily take organizational steps to make their
investor relations departments better equipped to reach out to
retail shareholders and offer programs specifically designed to
involve them more actively. 136 In the U.S. too, directors seem to be
engaging with retail investors to some extent: according to
respondents to a 2013 public-company directors survey, some 44%
of public company directors concerned were reported to engage
with retail shareholders “in some form of communication outside
the standard regulatory disclosures”. 137 In much the same way,
service providers, like proxy solicitation firms, have developed
strategies to engage retail investors in the proxy process for their
clients. Such strategies include using reminder mailings, toll-free
numbers for inbound calls, outbound calls offering the shareholder
the opportunity to vote on a recorded line, robocalls to
shareholders (i.e. recorded messages by a member of the senior
management recalling the importance of the vote), town hall
forums, blast emails and websites with links to the actual voting
site. 138
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970650 (finding that retail shareholders are strong
supporters of management; hence, reduced retail participation rates due to
electronic proxy material delivery leads to lower voting support for management
recommendations. Managers are found to be aware of this trend, and
strategically reliant on retail shareholder support to ensure that their agenda
passes. Thus, they try to garner retail support by changing the proxy material
delivery method, “opting for full-set (mailed) delivery of proxy materials
following periods of poor performance, high executive compensation, and when
the ballot contains proposals related to compensation and shareholder rights”.).
However, anecdotal evidence to the contrary is mentioned in BRUNSWICK
GROUP LLP, RETAIL INVESTORS’ VIEWS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND
WHY IT MATTERS (July 2015), https://www.slideshare.net/Brunswick/retailinvestors-views-of-shareholder-activism-summary-of-results (suggesting that
“the often “pro-management” retail shareholder base is more susceptible to
activist demands than originally thought”: retail investors are found to be aware
of activism; they believe that activists add long-term value, want to be informed
during activist campaigns, and are likely to vote if they care about the issue).
136
See OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., OWNERSHIP, at 7.
137
PWC & WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, DIRECTOR DIALOGUE WITH
SHAREHOLDERS—WHAT
YOU
NEED
TO
CONSIDER,
5
(2013),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20131010_PwC-Weil.pdf.
138
These tools were named by Donna Ackerly of proxy solicitor firm
Georgeson, Inc., during the SEC 2015 proxy voting roundtable: see 2015 Proxy
Voting Roundtable Unofficial Transcript, at 93-94.
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Hence, wider participation by all shareholders appears to
be in the interest of the issuers themselves. As former Deutsche
Post DHL CFO Lawrence A. Rosen put it,
we have the impression that listed companies know
much about the interests of their institutional
investors, but this does not necessarily apply to the
same extent to retail shareholders. A focus of our IRwork lays in communication with retail investors,
who in the end are to date involved at Deutsche Post
DHL with a € 3,3 bn investment. 139
Indeed, retail shareholder relations strategies serve
company-specific goals, building on a variety of not mutually
exclusive factors such as the company’s market history, its efforts
to build up a loyal shareholder base, the quorum for the general
meeting, making up for disinterest among institutional investors,
and developing a corporate image. 140 The quality of companies’
retail shareholder policies may not be the main factor driving the
investment choice; still, it has been found to impact individual
investors’ behavior. For example, retail investors who are
members of a shareholder club seem to be more active in attending
general meetings, possibly as a consequence of being more and
better informed. 141 Hence, shareholder policies seem to be a driver
for enhancing retail investor engagement. 142
Moreover, contrary to the received wisdom that considers
retail shareholders at the general meeting to be little more than
noise, some anecdotal evidence suggests that retail shareholders
that attend the meeting might perform a valuable monitoring
function. First, the right to ask questions is found to be important
to small individual shareholders and their representatives, while
institutional investors are offered other occasions for direct
dialogue with the board. The general meeting “must be considered
as the most important mean for private investors to challenge the
management board and the supervisory board”. 143 Second, the
issues raised for discussion at general meetings by small individual
investors are often the same as those raised by institutional
investors during other occasions for dialogue with directors. 144
139
140
141
142
143
144

See Pellens & Schmidt, supra note 42, at 9.
AMF, 2015 Study, at 11.

See AMF, Lettre, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 59.
See Van der Elst, supra note 73, at 21.
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Finally, retail investors’ voice matters from a theoretical corporate
law perspective, given that voting rights provide the balance of
power between the general meeting and the board of directors. 145
Irrespective of any utility it may or may not have on the practical
level, “investor participation in a firm’s decision-making process
has intrinsic value” 146, since
[c]orporate democracy and, specifically, minority
shareholder suffrage, legitimizes the exercise of
power by the public corporation’s insiders: the
controlling shareholder, directors, and managers.
Indeed, the shareholder’s right to vote is the
foundation upon which the public corporation is
constructed and sustained. 147

IV. ACTIVATING RETAIL VOTES: THE U.S. DEBATE
Retail shareholder voting passivity has recently been a
feature in the U.S. debate on corporate governance. With the drop
in retail share ownership and voter turnout at publicly listed
company meetings, regulatory changes and shareholder
empowering measures that have evolved over the last two decades
have fueled the debate surrounding the activation of small
individual shareholder votes.
Specifically, the significant restrictions gradually imposed
upon broker discretionary voting and sec. 957 of the 2010 DoddFrank Act have rendered retail shareholders’ low participation
See ROGER M. BARKER & IRIS H.-Y. CHIU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT. THE PROMISES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE
NEW FINANCIAL ECONOMY, 159, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham145

Northampton, MA (2017).
146
Dov Solomon, The Voice: The Minority Shareholder’s Perspective, 17
NEV. L.J. 739, 759-763 (2017).
147
Id. at 739 (further illustrating, at 744 and 756, that “Without the
mechanisms of corporate democracy and, specifically, the shareholder’s right to
vote, the exercise of power and control by the corporation’s insiders—its
controlling shareholder, directors, and managers—is stripped of its legitimacy
and ideological foundation”, it being understood that, while ownership and
control may be separated, “it is the implicit or explicit consent of the owners of
the corporation—i.e., the shareholders -that legitimizes managers’ exercise of
control”); see also Lee Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in
Corporate Elections, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 113 (2010) (noting that
“increased shareholder participation matches the generally shared Western
ideals that the ultimate owners should have some discretion and authority over
firm assets, regardless of whether their choices are value-enhancing”.).
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rates at annual meetings more clearly visible than before. The
previous regime that regulated brokers’ authority to vote
uninstructed shares on “routine” matters under New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) Rule 452 had been masking low retail voter
turnouts, given that, as evidence widely showed, brokers did vote
uninstructed shares, and tended to do so in line with board
proposals. 148 This factor contributed to shoring up the board’s
authority, since, as a matter of fact, the board was authorized to
rely on a certain proportion of votes that would almost
automatically be cast for its proposals. The virtual elimination of
discretionary broker voting that was achieved by classifying as
“non-routine” a growing number of voting matters (such as
uncontested director elections) resulted in lower retail voter
turnout rates. 149 Hence, voting power shifted towards institutional
investors, both traditional and activist. This outcome was further
enhanced by the rise of institutional investors 150 and the regulatory
changes that favored it, including most notably the strengthening,
in 2010, of say-on-pay advisory votes on executive compensation,
the stricter rules on mutual fund, investment adviser and pension
fund fiduciary obligations in relation to voting proxies, and the
proxy access Rule 14a-8, which has helped reduce plurality voting
and staggered boards.
Focusing on the highly complex U.S. proxy voting
system, 151 the Securities and Exchange Commission held a
148
See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV., 520, 561 (1990); Gulinello, supra note 120, at 563-64; Jennifer E. Bethel &
and Stuart L. Gillan, The impact of the institutional and regulatory
environment on shareholder voting, 31 FIN. MGMT., 29, 42 (2002) (finding that
broker votes account for about 13% of outstanding shares; hence, broker votes
are potentially outcome determinative at shareholders meetings); Jie Cai,
Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walking, Electing Directors, 64 J. OF FIN.,
2389, 2415 (2009) (estimating that “excluding the broker votes reduces the
percent of “for” votes by an average of 2.5%” in the sample analyzed); Stephen
Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality,
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 874 (2010) (noting that, “[u]nder the revised NYSE rules,
companies will lose a sizeable block of automatic votes in favor of their
nominees, shifting power to those shareholders who do vote”).
149
See Kastiel & Nili, supra note 132, at 62-63 (finding that “non-voting
percentages have spiked in matters where brokers were no longer allowed to
vote [uninstructed] shares. In uncontested elections the non-participation rate
jumped from 14% to 24%”. The significant increase in the prevalence of brokernon-votes has led to an overall increase in the ratio of shares that do not vote).
150
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency
Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89 (2017).
151
The complexity of the system is illustrated by Marcel Kahan & Edward
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roundtable on February 19, 2015 to explore possible improvements
to the proxy voting process, including how to increase retail
shareholder
participation—whether
through
disclosure,
education, technology or the voting mechanics. 152 As commissioner
Luis Aguilar acknowledged,
[d]ismal retail investor participation numbers persist
despite technological advances that should have
made it easier and more efficient for a widely
dispersed group of shareholders to engage with other
investors and their companies. 153
While no action has followed the SEC roundtable yet, on
November 9, 2017 SEC Chair Jay Clayton announced his
willingness to reconsider proxy voting and shareholder resolution
processes for public company annual meetings. 154 Chair Clayton
planned to start review by reopening the comments period for the
SEC’s 2010 concept release on the U.S. proxy system to solicit
updated feedback from market participants concerning the
strengths and weaknesses in the system. 155 Chair Clayton pointed
out that low participation rates in the proxy process may express
the need to update the proxy process. 156
The drop in retail shareholder participation in the proxy
process has also been addressed by scholars, and a variety of
possible approaches to foster retail voting have been proposed.
The assumption upon which analysis builds is that retail
investors’ apathy toward corporate voting also has its roots in the
information costs associated with voting; therefore, in addition to
rendering the mechanics of voting smoother, promoting retail
investor voting requires a reduction in information costs. 157 It is
worth noting that the costs of voting are not limited to collecting
and processing information; the cost of decision-making combines
with psychological factors which can further enhance passivity.
The relevance of such behavioral tendencies is illustrated
by experience with the U.S. proxy voting system. One such
Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 Geo. L.J. 1227 (2008).
152
See Proxy Voting Roundtable, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable.shtml.
153
2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable Unofficial Transcript, at 11-12.
154
See Clayton, supra note 82.
155
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System,
Release No. 34-62495 (July 14, 2010) [75 Fed. Reg. 42982 (July 22, 2010)].
156
Clayton, supra note 82.
157
See Gulinello, supra note 120, at 579.
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example concerns the “notice-only” (or “notice and access”) model
introduced in 2007 as an option for electronic proxy material
delivery by a company or another soliciting party, 158 which has
apparently discouraged retail shareholder participation.
Electronic proxy delivery has been found to significantly reduce
the voting response rate as a primary result of the lower likelihood
of response from retail shareholders. 159 The notice-only delivery of
proxy materials, which merely informs shareholders of the online
availability of proxy materials instead of mailing the “full set”,
reduces the cost to issuers by avoiding the distribution of paper
proxies and ballots. However, this method of delivery also lowers
the voting participation rate of retail shareholders. 160 Arguably, the
need to take proactive steps following a mailed notification to
access proxy materials available on a website, which is inherent in
the “pull” delivery model featuring the notice-only option, can
inhibit voting from the shareholders who are unwilling to make the
additional effort required. 161
Further, the length and language of proxy statements can
be confusing and also blur relevant information, negatively
affecting participation and voting. 162 On average, the duration of
retail investors’ electronic access to proxy statements is no longer
than five minutes, which, compared to the average length of the
material accessed, 163 and coupled with educational limits, can
easily lead to a decision not to vote at all. Moreover, information
contained in the proxy statements is often not truly illuminating.
158
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Fed.
Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 240, 249, and 274, 72).
159
Lee & Souther, supra note 135, at 16-17; see also Fabio Saccone, E-Proxy
Reform, Activism, and the Decline in Retail Shareholder Voting, 4 (Dec. 26,
2010) (The Conference Board Director Notes No. DN-021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1731362. Converging findings from previous research
are referenced by Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84
IND. L.J. 1259, 1283 (2009).
160
Lee & Souther, supra note 135, at 16-17.
161
See Fisch, supra note 1, at 26.
162
Even institutional investors consider proxy statements too long and
difficult to read and only rely on a small fraction of the information comprised
in them: see David F. Larcker, Ronald Schneider, Brian Tayan & Aaron Boyd,

2015 Investor Survey Deconstructing Proxy Statements—What Matters to
Investors, 1, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-

survyey-2015-deconstructing-proxy-statements_0.pdf
(illustrating
that
“Investors claim to read only 32 percent of a typical proxy, on average. They
report that the ideal length of a proxy is 25 pages, compared to the actual
average of 80 pages among companies in the Russell 3000.”).
163
See Kastiel & Nili, supra note 132, at 69.
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As has been noted with respect to director elections, after investing
some time reading the proxy statement, “[t]he retail investor would
learn very quickly that there was not much she could learn from a
proxy statement that would influence her vote one way or
another,” 164 it being unlikely she would find “information
regarding whether the director-nominees performed their duties
diligently and free of improper influence that might impair their
independent judgment.” 165
Significantly, unlike institutional investors, the average
retail investor cannot normally take advantage of information
shortcuts such as voting recommendations provided by proxy
advisory firms, nor engage in direct director-shareholder
dialogues.
Thus, when considering how possibly to activate retail
votes, behavioral tendencies and psychological limitations
associated with decision-making need to be kept in mind in
addition to addressing shortcomings in the voting mechanics. In
order to reduce such disincentives, inspiration from typical
institutional investors’ voting patterns can be helpful.
Along these lines, Professor Fisch contends that, in order to
increase the level of retail investor voting, retail investors that hold
their shares in street name (representing the majority of retail
shareholders in the U.S.) should be allowed—as institutional
investors only currently are—to submit standing voting
instructions (SVIs) to their intermediaries, on which basis nominee
record holders would cast their votes. SVIs
are voting guidelines or policies provided by an
investor to an intermediary in advance of a specific
shareholder meeting, directing how the investor’s
shares are to be voted. The intermediary then
applies these instructions to each shareholder
meeting, and casts the client’s vote in accordance
with those instructions, unless the client directs
otherwise. 166
To implement this proposal, changes need to be made to
current SEC proxy solicitation rules, given that nominees are
required to obtain separate instructions from the beneficial owners
on how to vote their shares at each company in which they own
164
165
166

See Gulinello, supra note 120, at 583.
Id. at 581.
Fisch, supra note 1, at 23.
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stock. This prohibits intermediaries from soliciting SVIs from their
customers. 167 Under the proposal, retail investors would be able to
“designate a set of voting preferences in advance, save their prior
voting preferences, or designate a set of guidance that will be
applied automatically” 168 by the broker or the platform. To compel
(and not just enable) brokers to accept SVIs, and overcome their
limited interest at facilitating retail voting where no affirmative
obligation or financial incentive exists, the SEC should “require
custodial brokers to provide investors with access to an Internetvoting platform” 169 offering retail clients “with comparable
functionality to that available to institutional investors, including
the ability to submit voting instructions through the brokers’
website and the ability to provide SVI.” 170
Building on behavioral economics tools and the theory of
“libertarian paternalism,” 171 one further proposal from Kobi
Kastiel and Yaron Nili suggests that retail investor participation
in the proxy voting process be facilitated
by providing them with a little “nudge” in the form
of highly-visible default arrangements that would
dramatically reduce the economic and mental costs
associated with voting. These default arrangements
would allow (or force) retail investors to choose
between several available voting short-cuts, such as
See id. at 40-41 (illustrating that the regulatory exception under Rule
14a-2(a) (1) for certain communications from the broker to its customers “limits
a broker’s ability to obtain standing voting instructions because, for the
exemption to apply, the broker must “furnish promptly” proxy materials to the
person solicited. By definition, the submission of SVI takes places prior to the
filing of proxy materials, making it impossible for the broker to satisfy this
requirement” when transmitting third-party proxy solicitation material to its
customers. Moreover, “Rule 14a-4(d)) also limits a broker’s ability to ask for
SVI”, since it “does not permit a proxy to confer voting authority “with respect
to more than one meeting” or for “any annual meeting other than the next annual
meeting . . . to be held after the date on which the proxy statement and form of
proxy are first sent or given to security holders”).
168
Id. at 24 (discussing the shortcomings of the mechanisms available for
retail shareholders to use the internet to submit their voting instructions, as
compared to those open to institutional investors).
169
Id. at 42.
167

170
171

Id.
See RICHARD R. THALER & CASS S. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE. IMPROVING

DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS, 2nd Ed. (2009), at 5-6;
Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1159 (2003); Thaler & Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 175 (2003).
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voting along with a specific large and sophisticated
shareholder, in accordance with the majority vote of
institutional investors not affiliated with
management, or in accordance with the
recommendation of a proxy advisor. 172
The investor would always be allowed to opt out of those
arrangements, but
if [she is] unlikely to invest time and resources in
making an informed decision on the merits, case by
case, [she] may now use a short-cut, choosing an
agent to make the choice for [her]. Making a single
choice regarding an agent rather than numerous
decisions on the merits of each topic, would reduce
the costs associated with voting, therefore making
the expression of preferences by retail investors
more likely. 173
Similarly to some extent, as specifically regards director
elections, Professor Gulinello envisages a coalition of private
professional organizations and self-regulatory organizations—
preferably compromising the American Bar Association Business
Law Section, the NYSE, the NASDAQ exchange, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and groups representing
directors of public companies—establishing and managing a
cognitive-shortcut system designed to help small individual
shareholders make informed voting decisions based on the release
of voting recommendations (he calls “Retail Investor Voting
Instructions—RIVI”) which will be delivered along with the
company’s proxy materials. 174 Voting instructions would be based
on information and statements provided by nominees by filling out
specific questionnaires—differently designed depending on how
aggressively the presumption of board authority is intended to be
challenged or preserved—eliciting specific key information. The
coalition would be able to gather the expertise required and “would
likely have the gravitas needed to persuade many public
companies to participate the system.” 175 To facilitate dissemination
of voting instructions to retail investors, the cooperation of brokers

172
173
174
175

Kastiel & Nili, supra note 132, at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
See Gulinello, supra note 120, at 583-597.
Id. at 594.
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should be enlisted (ideally, through FINRA requirements). 176 The
SEC should support the system externally by playing an active role
“in issuing the no-action letters and rule changes necessary to
accommodate the RIVI.” 177

V. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
PARTICIPATING IN THE VOTING PROCESS VIEWED
THROUGH THE EYES OF A RETAIL INVESTOR

The central position occupied by voting within the SRD
clearly reveals the assumption by European lawmakers that
shareholder participation in the voting process, including small
individual investors, is desirable. Promoting proxy voting by
removing restrictions or requirements not explicitly allowed under
Articles 10 and 11 of SRD is a tool for facilitating and encouraging
shareholder participation at general meetings, as also are other
tools considered under Articles 8 and 12. Notably, electronic realtime transmission of the meeting, real-time two-way
communication enabling shareholders to address the meeting from
a remote location, electronic voting and voting by correspondence
allow cost-effective participation at a distance and in absentia or
voting in advance of the meeting.
Against this backdrop, low retail voter turnout at general
meetings of European issuers casts doubt on the efficacy of the
measures adopted to achieve the policy goal established. It also
makes a comparative analysis of the proposals put forward in the
U.S. to activate retail votes all the more interesting in addressing
the same issue within the European context.

A. The promises and possible constraints of the (revised)
Shareholders’ Rights Directive
If the European regulatory framework relevant for voting
is considered from the particular standpoint of a retail investor,
two main obstacles may lower a shareholder’s incentive to be
active. First, as a matter of fact, retail investors, unlike
institutional investors, are rarely offered the opportunity to
participate at the meeting and vote the shares at a distance via
electronic means, also due to the non-binding SRD provisions.
Second, the extent to which the new SRD II provisions on
176
177

Id.
Id. at 595.
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shareholder identification and facilitating the exercise of
shareholders’ rights can actually help to foster retail engagement
will primarily depend on their transposition into national law.
Thus, despite the enabling stance adopted at the EU-wide level,
enhanced retail shareholder empowerment appears to rely
primarily on Member State choices and on the arrangements that
individual companies may take in this respect.
1. Enabling vs mandatory rules on exploiting technological
advance to facilitate retail participation in the voting process
One potential weakness of the current European
framework with regard to retail investor participation may lie in
the fact that addressee issuers are not compelled to use technology
in order to allow their shareholders to choose, if they so wish, to
participate the general meeting at a distance and vote
electronically during, or in advance of, the meeting. While
requiring Member States to empower companies to offer their
shareholders the opportunity to participate in the meeting by
electronic means, Article 8 of SRD vests discretion with the issuers
to decide whether or not to adopt any, or all, of the tools listed in
para. 1, namely (a) real-time transmission of the general meeting,
(b) real-time two-way communication enabling shareholders to
address the meeting from a remote location, and (c) electronic
direct voting, defined as “a mechanism for casting votes, whether
before or during the general meeting, without the need to appoint
a proxy holder who is physically present at the meeting.” 178
Similarly, under Article 12 of SRD, issuers may, but are not
required to, allow voting in advance of the meeting by e-mail
correspondence. 179
Hence, as a matter of fact, a retail shareholder willing to
vote her shares without appointing a proxy agent will, or will not,
be enabled to do so remotely or in advance of the meeting
depending, first, on the tools for casting votes that are permitted
under national law, and, second, on whether her investee company
actually offers her (one or more of) those tools. 180 Moreover, the
tools listed under Articles 8 and 12 do not all harness technology to
the same extent. Furthermore, a retail shareholder holding shares
Article 8(1)(c) of SRD.
Article 12 of SRD (requiring Member States to “permit companies to
offer their shareholders the possibility to vote by correspondence in advance of
the general meeting”) (emphasis added).
180
See supra, notes 178, 179 and accompanying text.
178
179
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in more than one company will likely find herself having to deal
with both different participation and voting tools, as well as with
different mechanics governing those options, depending on the
details provided in investee companies’ articles of association.
From the standpoint of an individual investor who is
potentially willing to vote her shares, it might seem questionable
as to whether such a flexible regime for the use of internet-based
technology could actually operate as an incentive to participate in
the voting process. Due to the variables left up to national law and
the companies concerned, the resulting picture may well be
disheartening and fragmentary. With the exception of Turkey (and
a few other countries in the European Economic Area), where it is
mandatory—and leaving aside the Nasdaq Tallinn pilot program
for blockchain technology-driven voting for companies listed on
the exchange 181—, electronic proxy voting is reported as
commonplace in Europe in regard to institutional investors. 182
Indeed, “global custodian banks typically bear the responsibility
for organizing voting for their institutional shareholder clients,
rather than the company itself, and it is overwhelmingly done via
electronic proxy voting.” 183
In contrast, particularly when considering the investor of
the future, technology arguably ranks amongst the most promising
tools for engaging retail shareholders. 184 There is anecdotal
evidence in relation to the UK that there exists “a younger
generation with a thirst for knowledge, the need to build wealth
for retirement, an appetite to invest and an increasing ability to
access online media resources” and that “ nearly a quarter (23%) of
retail investors would like to attend AGMs.” 185 This factor
See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, REV.
FIN. 7, 23 (2017) (discussing the potential corporate governance implications of
blockchain technology-driven changes).
182
Melsa Ararat & Muzaffer Eroğlu, Istanbul Stock Exchange Moves First
on Mandatory Electronic Voting Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance
and
Financial
Regulation,
(Nov.
6,
2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/06/istanbul-stock-exchange-movesfirst-on-mandatory-electronic-voting/.
183
Id.
184
A view shared by Fisch, supra note 1, at 38-39 (illustrating that the
model for harnessing technology to make retail voting more efficient “can be
found in the voting platform that market forces currently provide to
institutional investors” in the U.S.).
185
EQUINITI, RETAIL INVESTORS: TECHNOLOGY LED CHANGE AND THE
OPPORTUNITY (NEED) FOR INCREASED ENGAGEMENT, 4 and 6 (Dec. 2016),
https://equiniti.com/media/2754/1217-equiniti-white-paper-savings-and181
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indicates “that companies who actively engage through online
channels, will gain access to this growing retail investor base”,
which is crucial for investor relation programs to build shareholder
loyalty. 186 Whilst it is by no means obvious that the anecdotal
evidence from the UK could apply to other Member States to a
comparable degree, 187 it could still suggest that requiring issuers to
set up electronic voting facilities that render participation in the
process cost-effective might be particularly beneficial for retail
shareholders. 188
European lawmakers might therefore consider further
investigating whether a strengthening of the current SRD
provisions to compel issuers to adopt technology-driven
participation tools is needed to increase retail shareholder voter
turnout. This would not entail a shift towards a virtual, onlineonly model for general meetings—a model which, despite its
potential advantages, would require regulatory changes in some
European countries. 189 Under the hybrid regime, the shareholder
would be allowed to choose to participate in the physical meeting,
vote by e-mail, participate and vote electronically during the
meeting, or provide a proxy holder with voting authority.
Arguably, such an alternative-design approach to participation
would encourage voting by shareholders less familiar with
digitization.
Such an investigation would require, first, an in-depth
analysis of the extent to which European issuers actually offer their
shareholders access to participation-facilitating tools, the tools that
they offer, and the differences throughout the EU. Indeed, most
investments-survey.pdf. [hereinafter EQUINITY, RETAIL INVESTORS].
186
Id.
187
The SRD assumes national legislatures to “use their discretion to look
out for the optimal level of digital involvement of shareholders in the decision
making process”: Dirk Zetzsche, Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting
and the Shareholder Rights Directive, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 289, 331 (2008).
188
See EQUINITY, RETAIL INVESTORS, at 5 (finding that “nearly a quarter
(23%) of retail investors would like to attend AGMs, but only 6% do and 45%
said they would be more likely to attend a digital AGM.”).
189
See Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Blockchain and the 21st
Century Annual General Meeting, 14 EUR. COMPANY L.J. 167 (2017) (arguing
that “a decentralized system that makes use of blockchain solutions can strongly
enhance the position of the AGM, adapting it to twenty-first century technology,
and offering real solutions to the impediments of this nineteenth century static
corporate organ”. However, allowing for a virtual-only AGM would require
regulatory changes, since company law provisions in many Member States
assume that a physical AGM takes place).
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European jurisdictions allow for a combination of those tools; 190
but there is no clear EU-wide comparative evidence of the tools
actually available at the company-specific level. 191
Second, European lawmakers could investigate the
continuing validity of the arguments upon which Articles 8 and 12
were originally adopted. In the impact assessment concerning its
proposal for the SRD, the Commission acknowledged that any
shareholder “would significantly benefit from the possibility of
participating in General Meetings in absentia by electronic
means.” 192 However, also due to cost considerations concerning the
relevant technology, it contended that “imposing such a
requirement on all listed companies may not seem appropriate as
not all issuers have a significant number of cross-border
investors.” 193 More than a decade after the enactment of the SRD,
the Commission might consider assessing whether, and if so to
what extent, technology costs—primarily meaning those for
internet-based voting platform services—have decreased, taking
account of different levels of digitization, both in terms of the
infrastructure available at national level and the degree to which
people make use of, and rely on, web-based technology.
Third, more comprehensive information would be needed
concerning the true scale of retail shareholder willingness to
participate in the voting process electronically, or, in other words,
the scale of the disincentive effect attributable to the lack or
insufficient availability of electronic participation means, or to
burdensome operational schemes, taking account of the level of
coordination with brokers’ infrastructures.
At the very least, investigation would provide a better and
more current understanding of the factual background to the issue
under discussion. However, it is likely that no conclusion will be
reached in the near future as to whether it would be appropriate to
mandate the adoption of electronic facilities for the general
meeting at the European level.
See EUR. SEC’S MKT. AUTH., Report on shareholder identification and
communication systems, 29 and table 56 (ESMA 31-54-435) (Apr. 5, 2017)
190

[hereinafter ESMA, Report on shareholder identification]
191
In Italy, e.g., electronic meetings and direct electronic voting are an
option in “very few, if any, companies” only: B. Espen Eckbo, Giulia Paone &
Runa Urheim, Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Italy, 115 (Tuck
School of Business Working Paper No. 2009-64; ECGI - Law Working Paper
No. 174/2011) (January 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431733.
192
See Eur. Comm’n Staff, Annex, at 32.
193
Id. at 32-33
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It is likely to remain unclear whether the case for activating
retail shareholder voting will justify the imposition of additional
burdens on some Member States (those that are lagging behind in
terms of adequate infrastructure) and on any European listed
company, irrespective of the actual composition of its shareholder
base, the significance of its retail component or voter turnout. It is
not insignificant in this respect that, out of the 28 countries in the
European Economic Area that responded to a query by the
European Securities and Markets Authority, only Hungary and
Iceland reported that they had mandated provision of electronic
means to enable shareholders attend the meeting, including for
voting. 194 It is also noteworthy that this issue was not reconsidered
during the recently completed process for amending the SRD.
And it is true, indeed, that “[b]ecause shareholder
participation is costly, at some point it makes financial and
operational sense to stop promoting it.” 195 In the longer run, market
forces might drive the transition towards electronic participation
tools even without regulatory intervention. Although regulation
can accelerate the process, one important point against switching
towards mandatory EU regulation is that electronic tools to
participate in the meeting cannot possibly increase voting rates
from those shareholders who are absent due to decision-making
costs as regards how to vote their shares. Even if they were
provided user-friendly electronic tools to exercise their rights, these
shareholders would likely still not vote. Moreover, to achieve a
meaningful result, mandating electronic means of participating in
the meeting and voting EU-wide would require parallel
engagement with problematic issues arising out of the lack of
interconnectivity and interoperability between intermediaries’ and
proxy agents’ infrastructures, as well as cost allocation issues.
2. Moving forward towards a more efficient regime for
shareholder identification and for communicating with the
shareholder base
Issuers’ voluntary adoption of electronic means for
participating in the voting process might be encouraged following
the implementation of the SRD II. Article 3a of SRD II sets forth
See ESMA, Report on shareholder identification, 28-29. Note that the
SRD does not prevent Member States from imposing, or keeping in place,
further obligations on companies aimed at facilitating the exercise of
shareholder rights: see Article 3.
195
Hutchison & Alley, supra note 90, at 945.
194
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provisions that allow listed companies to identify their
shareholders within complex intermediated shareholding systems
in a precise manner. This should allow companies to improve
communication with their shareholder base, including retail
investors, develop more targeted communication programs,
promote shareholder usage of electronic means of participation,
and ultimately support shareholder engagement.
SRD II also provides for minimum standards to apply
throughout the UE as regards top-down and bottom-up
transmission of information relevant to the exercise of
shareholders’ rights along the investment chain. The new rules on
the transmission of information (Article 3b of SRD II) are aimed at
remedying the failure of the 2007 SRD in addressing the reluctance
of intermediaries to actively engage in the voting process. As has
been noted,
Custodians and depositaries typically do not
generate income by issuing voting entitlements or
proxy cards to their customers. Further, nominees
and custodians along the chain typically do not have
an economic stake in the shares. Consequently, these
intermediaries show no propensity to support the
exercise of their customers’ voting rights, and while
the company-level is widely digitalized little money
is invested in modernizing the technical
infrastructure for voting at the intermediary level. 196
As a consequence, “especially when the chain involves
many intermediaries, information is not always passed from the
company to its shareholders and shareholders’ votes are not
always correctly transmitted to the company.” 197 Hence, according
to Recital 12 to SRD II, intermediaries, including third-country
intermediaries that have neither an office nor their head office in
the EU,
should be obliged to facilitate the exercise of rights by
shareholders, whether shareholders exercise those rights
themselves or nominate a third person to do so. When shareholders
do not want to exercise the rights themselves and have nominated
the intermediary to do so, the latter should exercise those rights
upon the explicit authorisation and instruction of the shareholders

196
197

Zetzsche, supra note 187, at 327.
Recital 8 to SRD II.
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and for their benefit. 198
As is apparent, the SRD II rules on shareholder
identification and on the transmission of information are
complimentary in promoting the exercise of shareholder rights as
a policy goal. Shareholder identification encourages engagement
between a company’s investor relations department and its
shareholders; transmission of information along the investment
chain facilitates shareholders in exercising their rights—whether
voting, convening a general meeting, putting a new item on a
meeting’s agenda, or asking questions according to Article 9
SRD. 199
More precisely, Article 3a of SRD II entitles companies to
request that intermediaries along the chain provide information
regarding their shareholders’ identity. Further, Article 3a imposes
an obligation upon intermediaries to communicate information
regarding shareholders’ identities to the requesting company
“without delay.”
With respect to top-down information, Article 3b requires
intermediaries to transmit to shareholders information that the
company is required to disseminate concerning the exercise of
shareholder rights, unless a company directly provides such
information to all of its shareholders. However, intermediaries are
allowed to restrict transmission to a notice when the required
information is available on the company’s website. An
intermediary providing notice must only indicate the location of
required information within a company’s website. Conversely, as
regards bottom-up information, Article 3b requires bottom-up
information to be transmitted by intermediaries. When
intermediaries transmit bottom-up information, they must
transmit any information received from the shareholders that
relates to the exercise of their rights, and the transmission of
information must occur without delay and in accordance with
instructions received. Following the adoption of implementing acts
by the European Commission to set minimum requirements
regarding the types and format of information to be transmitted,
Article 3b should ensure that all shareholders receive participation
and voting entitlements, including depositary certification of the
investors’ shareholdings. Article 3b should also ensure that
companies receive participation notices from the shareholders and,
where applicable, a proxy card entitling the investor to exercise
198
199

Recital 9 to SRD II.

See also recital 4 to SRD II.

1/24/2019 10:28 AM

3-Balp (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

96

Vol. 31:1

rights on behalf of the nominee.
By reducing inconsistencies along the chain, Article 3b can
be beneficial for retail shareholders. In fact, in the absence of a
compelling information-transmission regime, retail shareholders
are faced with exceedingly burdensome and practically
insurmountable obstacles and costs associated with negotiating
individual voting support agreements with intermediaries. 200
Currently, the regulatory framework across Europe is uneven.
Certain jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, mandate a
combined system of public dissemination and individual
transmission of information relevant to the exercise of shareholder
rights. However, other jurisdictions, such as Italy, rely only on the
public dissemination of such information via the company’s
website; it is very unusual for retail investors to negotiate any
information transmission agreement along the chain. Hence,
inconsistent national regimes do not contribute to combatting
retail investor apathy.
In addition, Article 3c of SRD II stipulates that
intermediaries are obliged to positively facilitate the exercise of
shareholder rights, which can be done in one of two ways. First, an
intermediary can make arrangements for the shareholder or
shareholders’ nominees to exercise their rights themselves.
Alternatively, an intermediary can exercise a shareholder’s rights
“upon the explicit authorization and instruction of the shareholder
and for the shareholder’s benefit.”
Finally, Article 3c(2) and 3c(3) require dissemination of an
electronic confirmation upon the submission of an electronic vote
in order to ensure that shareholders oversee the exercise of their
voting rights. Further, shareholders must be given the right to
obtain confirmation that votes have been validly recorded and
counted by the company.
Against this background, several aspects need to be
considered from the particular standpoint of the retail investor.
First, as far as retail shareholder identification is concerned, the
effectiveness of an issuer’s ability to request and obtain insights
into its retail shareholder base might be curtailed to some extent
following the transposition of SRD II. This is because Article 3a(1)
allows Member States to restrict a company’s request to
shareholders holding more than a certain percentage of shares or
voting rights, not exceeding 0.5%. Thus, presumably due to costsaving considerations, a Member State may refrain from ensuring
200

See Zetzsche, supra note 187, at 332-33.
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that issuers obtain information concerning the identity of
shareholders whose holdings or voting rights do not reach the
minimum 0.5% threshold. As a result, an issuer’s interest in
reaching out to its retail shareholders may diminish. 201
Second, SRD II refrains from granting access to
information regarding shareholder identity to any individual or
entity other than the company. Currently, shareholders are
allowed to initiate the identification process in five jurisdictions
upon meeting a certain threshold in terms of share ownership or
voting rights. The threshold of share ownership or voting rights
varies between 3% and 10%. 202 Member States retain the ability to
extend the scope of national law in terms of individuals entitled to
access such information; however, there is no incentive to do so
under SRD II. It remains uncertain whether Member States will
adopt a more enabling approach unless they are compelled to do
so. This factor might prove to be problematic in situations
concerning the engagement of votes by silent retail investors. If
retail participation is to be taken seriously, companies will obtain
an advantage by permitting the issuer alone to identify retail
investors to contact and share views or gauge retail investor
preferences in view of an important and uncertain vote and
attempt to win them over.
Similarly, granting access to shareholder identification only
to the company will lead to a corresponding disadvantage for the
shareholders that are challenging the board or controlling
shareholders, which will not be easily justifiable under a regulatory
framework with the stated aim of facilitating shareholder
engagement as a monitoring tool. Allowing shareholders to initiate
the identification process is a means of sharing views on agenda
items, corporate action and governance, and reducing agency
problems between institutional and retail shareholders. 203 For
example, Italy adopted a fair approach, which might be a model
for other jurisdictions. Under the Italian law, the threshold
One further issue to be dealt with when a threshold for the process of
shareholder identification is set forth arises where a shareholder’s overall
holding is split into different accounts, some or any of which reaching the
threshold.
202
See, ESMA, Report on shareholder identification, at 21-22, note 30
(illustrating that a 3% minimum threshold applies in Spain; 5% applies in the
Slovak Republic; 10% applies in the UK and the Netherlands).
203
See Eilìs Ferran, The Role of the Shareholder in Internal Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Information, Communication and Decision-Making,
347, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE (Guido
Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004); ESMA, Report on shareholder identification, at 24.
201
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shareholders are required to meet for initiating the process
typically varies between 0.5% and 4.5% of the share capital
depending on the size of the company and its ownership
structure. 204 Another retail-friendly model to be taken into
consideration is that adopted in Spain. Under Article 497 of
Spain’s Ley de Sociedades de Capital, the entitlement to initiate
the identification process is extended to an issuer’s shareholder
associations provided they represent at least 1% of the company’s
share capital.
Third, the degree to which shareholder identification and
communication processes may effectively support both a
company’s interest in engaging their shareholder base and
shareholders’ interest in exercising their rights is dependent upon
the allocation of costs associated with the processes. Specifically,
the inquiry becomes whether those costs are imposed upon the
company or shared between the company and its shareholders.
Where a case is made for enhancing retail shareholder
participation, support may obviously result from the adoption of a
regime under which those costs are borne by the company, even
where the process is not initiated by the issuer. Such a regime
ultimately entails that all shareholders collectively bear the costs.
However, Article 3d of SRD II only provides that any charges
levied by an intermediary on shareholders, companies, and other
intermediaries “be non-discriminatory and proportionate in
relation to the actual costs incurred for delivering the services.”
Further, Article 3d of SRD II allows Member States to “prohibit
intermediaries from charging fees for the services provided for”
under Articles 3a, 3b and 3c. Thus, cost allocation is basically left
up to national law. As a result, national provisions may operate as
a driver of retail shareholder participation to a higher or lower
degree depending on the country’s cost-allocation regime or
whether the negotiation of a cost-allocation regime it is left up to a
company.
Finally, as far as top-down transmission of information
relevant for exercising shareholder rights is concerned, one point
of potential concern draws on a comparison with the U.S. noticeonly model for electronic delivery of proxy materials within the
proxy process. There appears to be some degree of negative causal
See jointly: Articles 83-duodecies and 147-ter of Legislative Decree No.
58 of February 24, 1998 (Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation
[hereinafter CLFI]), and Article 144-quarter of implementing regulation No.
11971 of May 14, 1999 issued by the Italian supervisory authority for financial
markets (Consob).
204
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correlation between the pull electronic delivery model for proxy
materials and retail voting response rate. 205 In contrast to a system
that facilitates the exercise of shareholder rights by requiring
intermediaries to coordinate the transmission of top-down
information according to a push delivery method, the SRD II
allows an issuer to disseminate information due prior to a general
meeting based on the pull model. 206 Under the pull model, a
company is only required to make top-down information available
on its website. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the adoption
of the notice-only model may be counter-productive as regards
retail voting response.
According to the draft implementing regulation of the SRD
II in relation to Articles 3a-3c, 207 a meeting notice must only
contain a URL hyperlink to the website on which full information
may be found, a specification of the message providing notice of an
upcoming meeting and of the issuer’s name and International
Securities Identification Number (ISIN). 208 Thus, basic
information concerning the specification of the meeting and the
agenda are omitted. As a result, the visibility and salience of voting
is reduced and negative drawbacks for retail participation
emerge. 209 To avoid discouraging voting through the
implementation of a minimum standard for notice, the EC should
reconsider its draft implementing regulation and require that the
notice include references to the items on the agenda.

B. Tagging along with third-parties’ voting preferences as a
possible way out of decision-making cost-driven inertia: a
comparative approach to the U.S. proposals for re-engaging

205
206
207

See infra Part IV.
See Article 3b(1)(b) of SRD II.
See Annex to the Draft Commission implementing Regulation

(EU) . . ./. . . laying down minimum requirements implementing the provisions
of Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as
regards shareholder identification, the transmission of information and the
facilitation of the exercise of shareholders rights, table 3, Ares (2018) 1944240
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares2018-1944240_en.
208
The ISIN code is a 12-character alpha-numerical code identifying a
security for trading and settlement purposes. The ISIN code is the only common
denominator securities identification number that is universally recognized.
209
See Fisch, supra note 1, at 25-26 (discussing the drop in retail voter
turnout at U.S. listed companies that followed introduction of the notice and
access model for proxy delivery).
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retail investors
As shown in Part V.A above, the European framework
emerging from the amended SRD vests Member States and
addressee companies with wide discretion with respect to
arrangements that may be made for the purpose of encouraging
retail shareholder participation in the voting process. When
transposing the SRD II into national law, Member States should
carefully consider adopting provisions that adequately meet the
need to activate retail shareholders and take advantage of the
possibilities allowed under European law to that end.
In spite of the above analysis, regulation scarcely impacts
decision-making costs shareholders incur when faced with voting.
U.S. scholars make it very clear that reducing retail investor
apathy arguably requires the decision-making barrier to be
addressed by taking account of the psychological tendencies that
affect retail shareholder behavior. Thus, the U.S. debate on
mobilizing retail votes builds on general premises that are also
shared by Europe. Alongside the costs associated with collecting
information, educational boundaries and information-processing
costs associated with making an informed voting decision may
typically impair retail shareholder willingness to participate the
voting process. While those limitations do not affect all retail
investors equally, they can have a decisive negative impact for
those who are not willing to bear the burden of voting.
One German study has found that “investors with better
resources, i.e., particularly well-educated or rather sophisticated
and more experienced retail investors, are more likely to use their
corporate voting right.” 210 This suggests that an increasing level of
cognitive resources should reduce voting-related information costs
and increase the likelihood of active corporate voting. 211 If this is
true, keeping in mind that investors with higher education are the
most likely to participate stock markets, 212 an incentive exists to
encourage retail investors to exercise their voting rights.
Minimizing the cognitive costs of informed voting could support
retail investors’ voting. Offering retail investors some kind of
short-cut with respect to informed voting could provide retail
investors a convincing incentive to decide participate in the voting
process.
An effective method of activating retail votes might,
210
211
212

Schmidt, supra note 122, at 71.
Id. at 95.
See Eurosystem Household Survey, at 43.

3-Balp (Do Not Delete)

2018

1/24/2019 10:28 AM

Corp. Governance Role of Retail Investors

101

arguably, be based on shifting decision-making costs to other
interested parties with more expertise, who are more educationally
and organizationally equipped to process information and make
voting decisions. The approach to voting shares generally adopted
by institutional investors is essentially quite similar to this.
Excessive information-processing costs are the very reason why
institutional investors retain proxy advisors. Proxy advisors’
voting recommendations actually provide a short-cut to help client
investors make informed voting decisions and to support them in
complying with the regulatory requirements that enhance their
stewardship and engagement role with investee companies.
Similarly, retail shareholders too should be allowed, if they so
choose, to rely on third parties’ voting preferences to be relieved
from excessive decision-making costs.
Allowing retail shareholders to tag along with more expert
investors, either institutional investors or the controlling
shareholders, or the board, could be viewed as an arbitrage
technique. Under this view, a reallocation of voting power into the
hands of those with superior information, processing skills, and
appropriate incentives would result. Reallocating voting power to
shareholders in a superior position should increase the efficiency of
voting. 213 By reducing the information asymmetry, “arbitrage
increases the probability that a majority of the shares will be voted
in favor of the correct option.” 214 Arbitrage techniques as a means
of increasing voting efficiency have been illustrated in relation to
proxy solicitations and vote buying. Contrary to retail shareholders
tagging along with third party voting, proxy solicitations and
voting buying drag other shareholders along with an individual’s
own voting preferences. While cost considerations and legal
constraints might reduce the effectiveness of proxy solicitations
and vote buying as arbitrage strategies to leverage superior
information, 215 tagging along in principle should not entail
comparable downsides because the process of arbitrage is freely
initiated by shareholders. Shareholders would choose which better
informed third party voting preferences most closely match their
own views. Thus, helping retail shareholders overcome decisionmaking costs by widening the range of tools available to choose an
agent to direct their voting decisions might usefully broaden the
reach of existing regulation with respect to accomplishing the
213
See Michael C. Schouten, The Mechanisms of Voting Efficiency,
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 763, 809 (2010).
214
Id.
215
Id. at 813-18.
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policy goal of increasing shareholder participation.
Returning to the U.S. debate, all of the proposals mentioned
above for winning back retail shareholder votes in a feasible
manner are grounded upon finding cost-effective cognitive shortcuts to reduce disincentives related to decision-making. Where
small, unsophisticated individual shareholders are involved,
“heuristics are inevitable.” 216 Gulinello attributes retail shareholder
reliance on more well-informed third parties to retail investor
voting recommendations (“instructions”) which are provided by an
private association of professional market participants. In
contrast, Nili and Kastiel envisage cognitive short-cuts in the form
of default voting arrangements to be offered to the shareholder
when accessing an electronic voting platform. Fisch frames a
somewhat different model.
Under Fisch’s model, the substance of voting decisions
within the proxy voting process rests with the shareholder.
However, the proxy voting process must occur according to
permanent voting instructions submitted by the shareholder after
establishing a sort of individual voting policy, which should be
automatically applied unless the shareholder decides to vote
differently. Here, cost-saving results from overcoming the need to
submit voting instructions for each individual matter at each
individual meeting. In addition, the decision-making shortcut
results from the fact that, when addressing her voting policy, the
shareholder may possibly tag along with the voting policies
adopted by institutional investors whose preferences more closely
resemble her own or in proxy advisors’ house voting guidelines.
1. Enhancing the role of retail shareholders’ associations
Under the model proposed by Gulinello, retail investors are
supposed to overcome their inability to make informed voting
decisions by means of voting instructions advising on how to vote
their shares in director elections. Decision-making is delegated to
the private association of market participants tasked with
disseminating the voting instructions. Unlike proxy advisors’
voting recommendations, here voting instructions seem to be
conceived of as a public good, given that participating
organizations are supposed to deliver instructions, and bear the
associated costs, without being compensated by those whom the
program is intended to benefit.
216

Gulinello, supra note 120, at 591.
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Due to special features that are peculiar to the U.S. system
of financial supervision, such a model for retrieving the passive
retail investor is unlikely to work in the European setting. In fact,
there is no FINRA-like private organization under European law
that holds EU-wide regulatory authority over broker-dealers and
exchanges and is subject to oversight by an SEC-like public
organization, which might run the program as a part of its
investor-education policy and have authority to actually require
cooperation from both the exchanges and intermediaries. The
program could not be run by the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA), since the ESMA lacks the authority to enlist
the cooperation of individual financial market participants.
According to Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010, 217 the regulatory and
enforcement authority of nationally based supervisory models is
not overridden by the ESMA. This is because (aside from credit
rating agencies and trade repositories) the ESMA is only granted
the power: to issue guidelines and recommendations concerning
the application of Union law in the relevant areas within the
practice of the national supervisory authorities; to require those
authorities to take specific action to remedy an emergency
situation; to foster supervisory convergence across the EU; to
actively promote a coordinated supervisory response; and to
develop draft regulatory technical standards to be submitted to the
EC for endorsement 218 Even if the ESMA could be entrusted with
the program, it would lack the desirable political independence,
given that the ESMA is “a Union body with legal personality” 219
accountable to the European Parliament and the Council 220
Still, the proposal evokes the enhanced role that may be
played by private shareholder associations in advising retail
investors on to how to vote their shares. The relevance of
shareholder associations is actually not the same in every
European country as regards the manner in which and the
intensity with which they contribute to retail shareholder
engagement with investee companies. Notably, while in some
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No.
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331)
84 (Dec. 15, 2010).
218
See Articles 8-10 of Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 (regulating the tasks
and powers of the Authority).
219
See Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 (defining the
Authority’s legal status).
220
See Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010.
217
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European jurisdictions, such as Italy, shareholder associations do
not play a significant role (if not, in some cases, at issuer-specific
level), in Germany investor associations have gradually become
stronger based on the long-standing proxy voting regime
established under § 135 of the Aktiengesetz. 221 Retail investor
associations such as the ‘Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger
e.V. (SdK)’, the ‘Dachverband der kritischen Aktionärinnen und
Aktionäre’ and the ‘Deutsche Schutzgemeinschaft für
Wertpapierbesitz e.V.’ (DSW) are reported to be traditionally
active at providing legal and proxy voting advice and voting
services, where voting advice is often offered for free irrespective
of membership requirements 222 Shareholder associations are also
active at tabling corporate governance-related countermotions at
general meetings, typically opposing the approval of the
management board, the supervisory board, or both. 223
One further example is Sweden, where the Swedish
Shareholders’ Association, comprising private individual
shareholders, has been remarkably successful in promoting its
members’ interests. The Swedish Shareholders’ Association has
been assisted by a unique regulatory tool that facilitates
shareholder participation, involving the creation of a nomination
committee independent from the board and made up entirely of
shareholders, who are elected at the annual meeting and charged
with assessing the board and making proposals to the
shareholders’ meeting concerning board election and
remuneration, auditor election and fees, and proposals for
appointments to the nomination committee itself. 224
See Strätling, supra note 44, para. 3 (2012) (illustrating how investor
association and their influence evolved along with regulatory changes).
222
Id. at 152 (explaining that associations “have an interest to provide a
collective good to benefit their members as well as non-members”, given that
they become the more influential, the more shares are voted in line with their
recommendations”, and further illustrating that the funding of the proxy
advisory and voting services offered for free rests on associations’ “ability to
attract members who are either intrinsically motivated or who also have an
interest in the opportunity to benefit from their legal advice, only offered to
members”.).
223
See Henry Schaefer & Christian Hertrich, Shareholder Activism in
Germany: An Empirical Study, 12 IUP J. CORP. GOV., 28, 29 (2013) (illustrating
that retail investors and their associations are the main users of engagement
tools such as the submission of countermotions for the agenda, while
institutional investors are less involved).
224
See Thomas Poulsen, Therese Strand & Steen Thomsen, Voting Power
and Shareholder Activism: A Study of Swedish Shareholder Meetings, 18 CORP.
GOV. INT’L REV., 329, 331-332 (2010) (explaining that small shareholders have
221

3-Balp (Do Not Delete)

2018

1/24/2019 10:28 AM

Corp. Governance Role of Retail Investors

105

Despite the current practical differences between European
countries, the German model shows that investor associations
might indeed play an enhanced role in providing retail
shareholders with cognitive short-cuts to decision-making in the
form of voting advice. It is noteworthy in this respect that SRD II
encourages associations to take on such a role, in that shareholder
associations are exempt from the transparency requirements
imposed upon commercial proxy advisors under Article 3j. 225 SRD
II defines a proxy advisor as “a legal person that analyses, on a
professional and commercial basis, the corporate disclosure and,
where relevant, other information of listed companies with a view
to informing investors’ voting decisions by providing research,
advice or voting recommendations that relate to the exercise of
voting rights”. 226 Hence, services provided by non-profit
associations, such as shareholders associations, which are not
offered on a commercial basis, fall outside the scope of SRD II.
The recently enacted legislation might therefore encourage
associations to offer their members free voting advice and provide
retail shareholders with a cost-effective “alternative to voting
abstention or voting according to the executive board’s
recommendations. This is an attractive option as, unlike
supervisory and executive boards, investor associations are bound
by their statutes to pursue the interests of private retail
investors.” 227 Moreover, shareholder associations do not have
business relationships with the companies they advise on, and—
unlike major proxy advisory firms—are less subject to biased
judgement due to conflicting interests. 228
a say in the committee, where in several cases they are represented by the
Swedish Shareholders’ Association. The committee works therefore “as a forum
for shareholders to employ the consensus principle”).
225
Article 3j of SRD II (setting out transparency of proxy advisors ) requires
proxy advisors to publicly disclose reference to a code of conduct which they
apply and to report on the application thereof on an annual basis, or to explain
why they do not apply a code of conduct. To inform their clients about the
accuracy and reliability of their activities, proxy advisors are further required to
publicly disclose information concerning the preparation of their research,
advice and voting recommendations. Finally, proxy advisors are required to
identify and disclose to their clients any actual or potential conflicts of interests
or business relationships that may influence the preparation of their research,
advice or voting recommendations and the actions they have undertaken to
eliminate, mitigate or manage the actual or potential conflicts of interests.
226
Article 2g of SRD II (providing the definitions relevant for the purposes
of the SRD II) (emphasis added).
227
Strätling, supra note 44, at 151-52.
228
Id. at 153.
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2. Enabling (or promoting) the submission of standing
voting instructions
Relevant SRD provisions seem to take an enabling stance
as regards standing voting instructions submitted by the retail
shareholder. Article 10(3)(b) of SRD allows, but does not compel,
Member States to restrict or exclude the exercise of shareholder
rights through proxy holders where specific voting instructions for
each resolution are lacking. 229 Furthermore, while requiring the
proxy holder to cast votes according to the instructions received by
the appointing shareholder, Article 10(4) of SRD does not assume
that those voting instructions must be submitted for each
resolution at each general meeting, and therefore does not prevent
the shareholder from submitting standing instructions to be
executed by the proxy holder unless revoked by the shareholder. 230
At the national level, the German proxy voting regime
based upon § 135 Aktiengesetz seems to be based on the same
enabling approach. In its current version, § 135(1) assumes that the
proxy holder—be it the custodian, a shareholder association or
another person (see para. 8 and 10)—has been provided with
explicit voting instructions concerning each item on the agenda. 231
This does not, however, mean that instructions need to be
submitted separately for a specific item each time it appears on the
agenda for an upcoming meeting. Shareholders are allowed to
submit voting instructions even long before a general meeting is
convened and the agenda is set, provided that the instructions refer
to individual items. 232 Hence, as long as they are sufficiently
detailed, voting policies can work as standing voting instructions
submitted in advance of future general meetings, to be executed by
the proxy holder each and any time an item appears on the agenda,
unless the shareholder directs otherwise. 233 The practice of
Under Article 10(3)(b) of SRD, which regulates proxy voting, Member
States “may restrict or exclude the exercise of shareholder rights through proxy
holders without specific voting instructions for each resolution in respect of
which the proxy holder is to vote on behalf of the shareholder” (emphasis added).
230
Article 10(4) of SRD only provides that “[t]he proxy holder shall cast
votes in accordance with the instructions issued by the appointing shareholder”,
without any specification as to the characteristics of such instructions.
231
§ 135(1) of the Aktiengesetz refers to “explicit instructions”
(ausdrückliche Weisungen) provided by the shareholder as a requisite for the
proxy holder to be entitled to vote the shares.
232
See Dirk Zetzsche, § 135 AktG, in 3/6 KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
AKTIENGESETZ 69-70 (n. 185) (Wolfgang Zöllner & Ulrich Noack eds., 3.rd ed.,
2016).
233
See id. at 73 (n. 199-202).
229
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submitting voting policies to operate as standing voting
instructions within the scope of § 135 is well-known in relation to
institutional investors and their relationship with custodian
banks. 234 Thus, there appears to be no reason why the same should
not apply to retail shareholders as well, even more so upon
consideration that the SRD II requires intermediaries to positively
facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights.
Arguably, small individual investors may examine some
major institutional investor’s voting policies, which are usually
available on the internet, and establish their own standing voting
instructions following the lead set by those institutional investors
whose voting policies come closer to their own views, or that they
consider reasonable and are therefore willing to share. The very
same applies in relation to commercial proxy advisors’ proprietary
voting guidelines and those prepared by shareholder associations.
Major proxy advisors’ yearly updated national or regional house
voting guidelines are available on the firms’ websites, either
voluntarily, having signed up to the industry’s 2014 “Best Practice
Principles for Shareholder Voting Research”, 235 or according to
Article 3j(2)(e) of SRD II, which requires proxy advisory firms to
publicly disclose “the essential features of the voting policies they
apply for each market” on an annual basis. 236
Nonetheless, national provisions on proxy voting currently
in place in other European jurisdictions set out a stricter regime
that constrains a retail shareholder’s ability to submit standing
voting instructions. Under Italian law for instance, only
intermediaries that provide collective investment management
services are allowed to appoint a proxy for more than one
individual general meeting. 237 Unlike investment managers, retail
234

Id.
See BEST PRACTICE PRINCIPLES

FOR PROVIDERS OF SHAREHOLDER
VOTING RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, Guidance to Principle One, para. 5(b)(ii)
(March
2014),
https://bppgrp.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/BPPShareholderVoting-Research-2014.pdf.
236
Article 3j(2)(e) of SRD II. Article 3j(2) of SRD II requires information
subject to public disclosure to be “made publicly available on the websites of
proxy advisors and [to] remain available free of charge for at least three years
from the date of publication”.
237
See Articles 135-novies (8) of CLFI [allowing that, as an exception to the
general rule set forth by Article 2372 (2) of the Italian Civil Code, intermediaries
mentioned in the above text “may grant a proxy for more than one shareholders’
meeting”], and 142 (1) of CLFI [stating that proxies to soliciting shareholders’
associations “may be given only for one shareholders’ meeting that has already
been called, remaining effective for subsequent calls where applicable”].
235
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shareholders are therefore not permitted to appoint a proxy that
has authority to vote on their behalf on an ideally permanent basis,
which in turn frustrates their potential willingness to submit
standing voting instructions. For, even if the shareholder were to
frame her own voting policy, she still would find herself compelled
to nominate a proxy holder separately for each upcoming meeting.
This brings out once again the potential relevance of psychological
constraints that, due to the additional effort required, may
eventually lead the shareholder to abandon proxy voting.
Thus, despite the enabling SRD provisions, national
regimes appear to be anything but uniform. Concerns about retail
voters’ awareness and the potential for establishing standing
authority by means of permanent proxies underlie the constraints
imposed upon proxy voting under some national regimes.
However, the existence of somewhat retail-unfriendly provisions
does not help increase retail voter turnout. Again, in line with the
European policy goal, the Member States concerned should
consider amending national provisions in a way more favorable to
retail shareholders.
Significantly, the facilitating of retail votes by allowing for
the submission of standing voting instructions is not in tension
with SRD II’s policy goal of encouraging informed voting. Retail
uninformed voting has risen concern in the U.S. too. 238 However,
as has been argued by Fisch, the risk of encouraging uninformed
voting is sufficiently narrow as to not justify the SEC’s refusal to
level the playing field between institutional and retail shareholders
as regards SVIs. 239 Similarly, the issue of uninformed retail voting
cannot be made under the European regulatory framework. The
enabling SRD and SRD II regimes clearly show that concerns on
this score are misplaced, as also does the German regime. 240
In fact, the submission of voting instructions in advance of
a meeting, and hence prior to dissemination of the relevant
mandatory disclosures, does not contradict the relevance of such
disclosures. This is because, as is also the case where voting
See comments from panelist Reena Aggarwal 2015 in Proxy Voting
Roundtable Unofficial Transcript, at 90-91 (emphasizing the need to focus on
“how to increase informed retail participation, not just increasing retail
participation for the sake of increasing the numbers”, and conceding that if retail
investors could access, e.g., mutual fund voting reporting, they at least would
“have some benchmark as to how others are voting and that might serve as
useful information.”).
239
See Fisch, supra note 1, 43.
240
See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
238
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instructions are submitted separately for each issue and each
meeting, the shareholder always retains authority to revoke her
standing instructions, either permanently or with regard to one
single upcoming meeting. 241 As a consequence, where, upon
disclosure of the relevant information by the issuer, the
shareholder reaches a decision and directs her proxy holder
otherwise, she would not be prevented from doing so. Even more
importantly, the retail shareholder—unlike institutional investors
managing other people’s money—is under no obligation (either to
vote or) to make informed voting decisions. 242 Informed voting is
an issue to be carefully reckoned with where investment managers
are concerned, who are legally entitled to make voting decisions in
lieu of, but also in the interest of, the end-investors whose economic
interests are at stake. By contrast, since they are directly entitled
to decide (whether and) how to vote and have a stake in the game,
retail investors may be encouraged by the law, but not compelled,
to be informed shareholders. As Professor Fisch notes in relation
to federally-mandated issuer disclosures, “the principle behind the
federal disclosure system is to require that the mandated disclosure
be sent to each investor, not that each investor read it,
acknowledge that they have read it, or demonstrate his or her
familiarity with its contents prior to investing or voting.” 243
Moreover, if—as some data show 244—shares are directly owned
largely by educated (though non-expert) individuals, the issue of
uniformed voting might lose some appeal with respect to
establishing standing voting instructions.
However, given that framing one’s own voting policy
requires a special, ex ante effort at decision-making (albeit reduced
by the potential to tag along with better informed third parties),
this factor might give rise to a chilling effect for uncommitted retail
shareholders. This kind of constraint seems, instead, to be reduced
under the model proposed by Kastiel and Nili, where, upon access
to her brokerage account, the shareholder would be offered default
arrangements allowing her to choose, unless she opts out, between
Article 11(3) of SRD (regulating the formalities for proxy holder
appointment and notification) makes explicit reference to the “revocation of the
appointment of a proxy holder”; although it does not explicitly mention the
revocation of voting instructions, the power to revoke such instructions is
inherent in that to revoke the proxy holder.
242
Fisch, supra note 1, at 47-49 (referred to U.S. State law).
243
Id. at 49-50.
244
See Eurosystem Household Survey, at 43; Maarten van Rooij,
Annamaria Lusardi & Rob Alessie, Financial literacy and Stock Market
Participation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 449-472 (2011).
241
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a number of short-cuts available, “such as voting along with a
specific large and sophisticated shareholder, in accordance with
the majority of institutional investors not affiliated with
management, or in accordance with the recommendation of a
proxy advisor.” 245 Tagging along with the board should also be
offered as an option, as well as withholding votes or choosing not
to choose at all. In short, allowing the shareholder to choose an
agent for decision-making is supposed to render the voting process
more accessible and make “the expression of preferences by retail
investors more likely.” 246
If considered from a European perspective, it seems that,
under the current regulatory and practical arrangements, a similar
model could only be established through regulatory changes. Even
if retail shareholders actually voted electronically upon accessing
their broker accounts, it would be necessary to regulate the specific
contents of the short-cuts to be offered the shareholders. This is
because, arguably, in order to allow for an independent choice, the
framing of those shortcuts should not be left up to the company or
the intermediaries. Moreover, some of the shortcuts proposed
appear to be difficult to implement, such as voting in line with a
proxy advisor voting recommendations. In fact, voting
recommendations are not public goods; hence, even though the
recommended direction of the votes is usually publicly known
prior to the meeting, this cannot be automatically be taken for
granted in relation to any issue being voted upon.
3. Summarizing issuers’ disclosures
Despite the above conclusions, one further model that
might possibly be replicated to facilitate retail investors’ voting
decisions is that based on the prospectus summary. 247 Given that
information overload associated with the length and language of
issuers’ information materials prior to a shareholders’ meeting is
likely to discourage the processing of that information, 248 one way
Kastiel & Nili, supra note 132, at 59.
Id.
247
See infra Part I.
248
See infra Part IV. As discussed in more detail by Jeffrey Cohen, Lori
Holder-Webb, Leda Nath & David Wood, Retail Investors’ Perceptions of the
Decision-Usefulness of Economic Performance, Governance, and Corporate
Social Responsibility Disclosures, 23 BEHAV’L RES. ACCT. 109, 111 (2011),
245
246

“With the rise of behavioral finance, it has become apparent that the content
and format of disclosures influences retail investment decisions.” Arguably, the
same might apply as regards retail investor voting.
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to provide the retail shareholder with an incentive to keep pace
with relevant information is to offer a shortened, simplified version
of the information.
Summarized AGM information might be helpful
irrespective of how the shareholder chooses to cast her votes, i.e.
both where she is unwilling to delegate voting decisions to better
informed third parties, and where those decisions are instead
delegated, whether formally (by appointing a proxy holder),
substantially (as is the case, e.g., under the Nili and Kastiel model),
or by means of standing voting instructions inspired by third party
voting policies. Summarized information can help the shareholder
maintain control over the proxy process where standing voting
instructions have been previously submitted by her; the
availability for each upcoming meeting of short information in
ordinary language would at least make it less unlikely that the
retail shareholder might check for any new information that could
potentially lead her to deviate from her previous instructions and
direct her proxy holder to vote otherwise. This would be especially
helpful where important and contested issues are to be voted at the
shareholder meeting.
From the legal standpoint, it is indeed unclear why retail
investors should be offered summarized information in the context
of private offerings, where corporate funding is at stake and retail
shareholders act as capital providers, but not when their role as
shareholders is under consideration. If retail investors are a target
of wide-ranging EU regulatory policies aiming at strengthening
EU financial markets by fostering their investments, unless they
are prevented from directly accessing the equity markets and
compelled to rely on investment managers only—which is not the
case either in Europe or the U.S.— 249 it is unclear why, looking
beyond their capital supply role, they should not deserve more
nuanced consideration also as shareholders and be offered
249
See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACC’T
RES. (2009) , at 417-418 (arguing that, to protect uneducated and
unsophisticated investors from risky financial decisions, “the goal of preventing
unsophisticated households from investing directly in securities markets is a
laudable one”, but that “it is probably not achievable”); Langevoort, supra note
84, at 1065-67 (hypothesizing that an institutions-only market, although
politically infeasible, would be more efficient than one that includes retail
investors and would lead to better corporate governance); but see Alicia Davis
Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1116-25 (2009)
(contending that eliminating the participation of individual investors could
lower market efficiency, and noting that many institutional investors fail to
serve as effective corporate monitors).
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summarized information in the same way as they are in relation to
public offerings.

VI. CONCLUSION
Retail investors’ absence from the corporate voting scene
comes at a price in terms of the potential effectiveness of board and
controlling shareholder accountability. When considering how
possibly to activate retail shareholder votes at general meetings,
behavioral tendencies and psychological limitations associated
with decision-making need to be addressed alongside the voting
mechanics. To lessen the reach of those disincentives, inspiration
from voting patterns usually followed by institutional investors
can be helpful. Allowing retail shareholders, if they so wish, to tag
along with better informed third-party voting preferences may be
a possible way out of decision-making cost-driven apathy.
The relevant European regulatory framework vests
Member States and addressee companies with wide discretion as
regards the provisions and arrangements that may be taken to
encourage retail shareholder participation in the voting process. 250
Despite the potential shortcomings of the European framework,
Member States should be wise to consider carefully the issue of
activating retail shareholders when transposing the SRD II into
national law, and to shape national provisions accordingly by
taking advantage of the possibilities allowed under the European
regulation.
The voting process should evolve towards digitization, and
shareholders throughout the EU should not be charged for
participating in the meeting and voting electronically.
Importantly, the right to initiate the identification process should
be granted the shareholders and shareholder associations as well;
the related costs should be borne by the company. Restricting
identification to shareholders whose holdings reach a minimum
threshold might prevent initiating parties from reaching out to a
significant part of a company’s retail shareholder base;
identification should therefore preferably be constrained only upon
objection from individual shareholders.
To reduce decision-making costs associated with voting,
retail investors should be allowed to submit standing voting
instructions based on a policy that might tag along with voting
guidelines established by institutional investors, proxy advisors or
250

See supra Part V.A.
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shareholder associations. Investor associations might play an
enhanced role in providing retail shareholders with cognitive
short-cuts to decision-making in the form of voting advice, given
that transparency requirements imposed upon commercial proxy
advisors do not apply. Mandating summarized AGM information
might also help reducing decision-making costs for retail
shareholders.
Individual companies might further encourage retail
participation by means of incentivizing tools: upon consideration
of constraints possibly deriving from European rules on
shareholder equal treatment and shareholder distributions, an
attendance bonus for participating the meeting (as experimented
in Spain at some general meetings) 251 might incentivize retail
voting. Experiments such as Bank of America’s campaign to
donate $1 to the Special Olympics on behalf of every individual
investor who returned a voted proxy might also be helpful to
support retail voting. 252

See, e.g., Iberdrola S.A.’s 2018 attendance bonus scheme, offering an
attendance bonus of € 0.005 per share (€1 gross) for every 200 shares for
attending, delegating or voting remotely at the general meeting:
https://www.iberdrola.com/corporate-governance/general-shareholdersmeeting/2018-gsm/attendance-bonus. Although Spanish law does not regulate
the practice of granting attendance premiums, the Spanish Corporate
Governance Code approved by the Stock Market National Commission
(CNMV)
on
Feb.
18,
2015
(https://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/Good_Governance
en.pdf) considers attendance premiums as a measure for “encouraging
shareholders to participate in general meetings and combating absenteeism”: see
Recommendation 11 (recommending, in order to promote transparency, that
“[i]n the event that a company plans to pay for attendance at the general
meeting, it should first establish a general, long-term policy in this respect”).
252
See Carl Hagberg, BofA’S Donations to Special Olympics produced Big
New-Voter Turnout, The Shareholder Service Optimizer Online,
http://www.optimizeronline.com/article/103330/more-news-from-the-2017meeting-front-the-best-worst.
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